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ABSTRACT

FORECASTING:
EXPECTATIONS, INTENTIONS, AND CONFIDENCE
David Michael Rothschild
Advisor: Justin Wolfers
All three articles in my dissertation gather information from individuals, analyze it, and
aggregate that information into forecasts of upcoming events. The motivation is to make
forecasts more efficient (accurate and timely), more versatile (provide the most useful
information for each stakeholder), and more economically efficient (equally or more
efficient and versatile for less time and/or money). The first article looks at prediction
markets and polls and concludes that prediction market-based forecasts are more
efficient. The two methods, polling versus prediction markets, vary in four key ways:
sample selection (a random sample of representative group versus a self-selected
group), question type (intention versus expectation), aggregation method (average
versus weighted by money, a proxy for confidence), and incentive (not incentive
compatible versus incentive compatible). The second article isolates the second aspect of
that list by comparing the efficiency of forecasts created by polling the respondents on
their expectations versus intentions. Expectation-based forecasts are more efficient, even
using non-random samples for the expectation. Asking the expectation question to one
respondent is the equivalent of asking several respondents the intention question.
Further, the expectation question helps adjust the sample to be more representative of
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the target group. The third article tests a new interactive web-based interface that
captures both ‚best estimate‛ point-estimates and probability distributions from nonexperts. In contrast to standard methods of directly asking respondents to state their
confidence, using my method, which induces the respondents to reveal confidence, there
is a sizable and statically significant positive relationship between confidence and the
accuracy of individual-level expectations. This positive correlation between confidence
and accuracy can be utilized to create confidence-weighted aggregated forecasts that are
more efficient than the standard ‚consensus forecasts.‛
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Forecasting Elections:
Comparing Prediction Markets, Polls and their Biases
Abstract
Using the 2008 elections, I explore the accuracy and informational content of
forecasts derived from two different types of data: polls and prediction markets. Both
types of data suffer from inherent biases, and this is the first analysis to compare the
accuracy of these forecasts adjusting for these biases. Moreover, the analysis expands on
previous research by evaluating state‐level forecasts in Presidential and Senatorial races,
rather than just the national popular vote. Utilizing several different estimation
strategies, I demonstrate that early in the cycle and in not‐certain races debiased
prediction market‐based forecasts provide more accurate probabilities of victory and
more information than debiased poll‐based forecasts. These results are significant
because accurately documenting the underlying probabilities, at any given day before
the election, is critical for enabling academics to determine the impact of shocks to the
campaign, for the public to invest wisely and for practitioners to spend efficiently.

I.

Introduction
Starting in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight.com

revolutionized election forecasting for the general public. Until his website was
launched in March of 2008, those interested in predicting election outcomes typically
reviewed national polling results that asked a representative cross‐section of voters who
they would vote for if the election were held that day. Yet, these raw poll numbers are
volatile, subject to random sampling error on either side of the true underlying value.
For example, on the eve of the 2008 Presidential election, national polls showed Obama’s
lead over McCain ranging anywhere from 2 to 11 percentage points. Starting in the 2000
election cycle, poll aggregation organizations made an improvement by publishing less
1

volatile averages of raw polls; the leading poll aggregators, Pollster.com and
RealClearPolitics.com, both had final averages showing Obama winning by 7.9
percentage points over McCain (the final margin was 7.4 percentage points).1 Although
an improvement over raw poll numbers, these estimates still succumb to two well‐
known poll‐based biases, especially earlier in the cycle: polls demonstrate larger margins
than the election results and they have an anti‐incumbency bias (i.e., early leads in polls
fade toward Election Day and incumbent party candidates have higher vote shares on
Election Day than their poll values in the late summer into the early fall).2 Further, they
do not provide a probability of victory. In contrast, FiveThirtyEight aggregates raw poll
numbers, debiases them toward expected vote share, and then produces a probability of
victory. After FiveThirtyEight’s strong showing in the Presidential primaries, the
discussions of political junkies around the country quickly transformed from focusing
on the latest polls to the probability of victory.
Less heralded by the public, prediction markets have been providing prob‐
abilities of victory since well before FiveThirtyEight. The Iowa Electronic Market
launched the modern era of prediction markets in 1988, introducing a winner‐takes‐all
market in 1992. This type of market trades binary options which pay, for example, $10 if
the chosen candidate wins and $0 otherwise. Thus, if there are no transaction costs, an
investor who pays $6 for a “Democrat to Win” stock and holds the stock through
Election Day, earns $4 if the Democrat wins and loses $6 if the Democrat loses. In that
scenario, the investor should be willing to pay up to the price that equals her estimated
probability of the Democrat winning the election. The market price is the value where, if
a marginal investor were willing to buy above it, investors would sell the stock and
drive the price back down to that market price (and vice‐versa if an investor were

Unless noted, all margins are calibrated as the two‐party total margin (i.e. if Candidate A has 52
percent support and Candidate B has 44 percent support, Candidate A’s margin is
8.3
1

percentage point).
2 Campbell (2000), described in next section.
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willing to sell below it); thus, the price is an aggregation of the subjective probability
beliefs of all investors. Scholars have found that prediction markets are a reliable
forecaster in the last few cycles.3 This is true even though raw prediction market prices
experience what is known as the favorite‐longshot bias, which drives prices away from
probabilities at the tails (i.e., a mean probability of 95 may translate into a price of 85).4
Motivating the analysis in this article is a basic question: are polls or prediction
markets more accurate in forecasting elections when the biases of both approaches are
corrected? The answer is crucial for researchers studying electoral politics because
accurate forecasts allow them to connect shocks to the campaign with changes in the
underlying probability of victory, as well as for those studying forecast techniques in a
wide range of fields besides politics. It is meaningful to the media that wishes to bring
the public the best forecasts, especially as the public decides when and where to invest
its time, attention, and money. Finally, better forecasts can help practitioners make more
efficient choices when they spend money in the multi‐billion dollar industry of political
campaigns.5
My analysis finds that in the 2008 election cycle FiveThirtyEight’s debiased poll‐
based forecasts were, on average, slightly more accurate than Intrade’s raw prediction
market‐based prices.6 But when prediction markets are properly debiased, they are more

Like much of the previous research, the analysis in this paper relies on Intrade. Intrade is used
exclusively because, unlike its competitors, it has markets for all of the Presidential and
Senatorial races. In the 2004 Presidential race, it had a greater than 50 percent chance of victory
for the winning candidate, on the eve of the election, in all 51 sovereignties.
4 Leigh et al (2007), described in next section.
5 $1.76 billion was spent on the 2008 Presidential election with an additional $0.94 billion and
$0.43 billion on House and Senate elections respectively. The data is from
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/index.php.
6 Thus, the public made the correct choice, between the readily available forecast options, by
predominantly utilizing FiveThirtyEight. Starting in late September of 2008, FiveThirtyEight’s
page views jumped from about 2x that of Intrade’s to over 7.5x; on Election Day FiveThirtyEight
had an astonishing five million page views. See Appendix, Figure A1, for chart of page views.
Data is from http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/fivethirtyeight.com and
3
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accurate and contain more information than debiased polls; this advantage is most
significant for forecasts made early in the cycle and in not‐certain races (i.e., the races
typically of most interest).

II.

Background
A succession of papers in economics, law, political science, and the popular press

have concluded that raw prediction market prices are more accurate predictors of
election outcomes than raw polls. The earliest empirical papers originate from studies of
the Iowa Electronic Market, with Berg et al. (2001) demonstrating that prediction
markets outperform polls in predicting vote share.
The literature is conclusive that polls suffer from biases. Campbell (2000)
illustrates the polls’ two biases with a chart of the final incumbent party candidate vote
share from 1952–1996 on the y‐axis and the early‐September national polls for the
incumbent party candidate on the x‐axis. The slope of the regression line is 0.55,
demonstrating that leads evaporate by nearly a half. The anti‐incumbency bias is
demonstrated with the regression line crossing through 50 percent vote share when the
poll value is 47 percent (i.e., an incumbent with a poll value of 47 percent receives 50
percent of the vote in expectation).
At the same time, a separate literature has shown that prediction market prices
also suffer from inherent biases. In a theoretical paper, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, p.
108) assert that “In a truly efficient prediction market, the market price will be the best
predictor of the event, and no combination of available poll or other information can be
used to improve the market‐generated forecast.” Manski (2005) highlights Wolfers and
Zitzewitz’s “efficiency” caveat and demonstrates theoretically that issues regarding the
risk profile of the traders distort the translation of investors’ mean probability beliefs
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10silver.html?scp=5&sq=Stephanie%20Cliff
ord&st=cse.
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into prices. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) show that in addition to non‐risk neutral
investing, the favorite‐longshot bias inherent to prediction markets is caused by
transaction costs and liquidity concerns. To illustrate this bias, assume that an investor
believes the Democrat has a 95 percent chance of winning sixty days before the election.
Because of the opportunity costs of the bet being held for 60+ days (there is limited
liquidity in many markets) and transaction costs of $0.015 per $1.00, the investor will
actually bid up to only about $0.85 per $1.00, rather than $0.95 per $1.00. Further, if there
are two bets that are equal in expectation, the investor gains more utility from betting on
a longshot.7 The bias is documented empirically in Leigh et al. (2007).8 (I am not testing
the efficient market principle in this paper, but I accept that arbitrage is not capable of
overcoming the inherent bias in this particular market.)
In a recent paper in this journal, Erikson and Wlezien (2008) advance the debate
between polls and prediction markets when they argue that while raw prediction
market prices may provide more accurate forecasts than raw polls, adjusting the polls
for known biases reverses this result. Thus, they argue that “market prices contain little
information of value for forecasting beyond the information already available in the
polls” (2008, p. 24). The problem is that Erikson and Wlezien do not advance the
literature far enough. Their paper is the first empirical comparison that includes
debiased polls and it is the first to focus on probability of victory, rather than just
expected vote share. But the authors treat the well‐documented favorite‐longshot bias in
prediction markets as a weakness of the markets rather than a systematic bias that can
easily be corrected. In their conclusion they note the persistent problem of “The winner‐
takes‐all market ...overvaluing longshot candidates’ chances of victory” (p. 24).

Neither Manski nor this paper conclude whether investors are risk loving or beset by
misconceptions or Prospect Theory, but it is accepted in the literature that they are not risk
neutral.
8 A preliminary version of Leigh et al (2007) was presented at the 2007 UC Riverside conference
on Prediction Markets.
7
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This analysis extends the literature in three main ways. First, it debiases both
prediction market and polling forecasts when comparing their accuracy. Second, it
updates Erikson and Wlezien’s approach so that it can be applied to state‐level races and
consequently evaluates a much larger sample of elections. Finally, it utilizes a more
sophisticated transformation of the raw polls that improves upon Erikson and Wlezien’s
method, while maintaining its general structure. This new method debiases and then
transforms the poll aggregation values, while Erikson and Wlezien debiases and then
transforms the raw poll numbers. Using Erikson and Wlezien’s method, the probability
in some races swing an implausible 30–40 percentage points around a trend on a daily
basis, making it of little use for real‐time predictions.9 Thus, this approach is both more
realistic and easier to compare with prediction markets. In addition, the analysis also
tracks the forecasts of FiveThirtyEight, the best‐known poll forecaster. Although the
method used by FiveThirtyEight is somewhat opaque, it offers an interesting
comparison to the other forecasts. Since FiveThirtyEight reports its probabilities in real
time, there is no concern of inadvertent look‐ahead bias that could afflict forecasts
created ex‐post.

III.

Data
The analysis examines seventy‐four races over the last 130 days of the 2008

campaign: fifty Presidential Electoral College races and twenty‐four contested Senatorial
races. This is in contrast to the four national Presidential races (1992–2004) reviewed by
Erikson and Wlezien (2008). None of the seventy‐four elections are completely
independent; there are national as well as regional trends that affect several to all of the
polls at one time. Yet, on any given day, the seventy‐four different forecasts represent
seventy‐four different decisions about how to weigh the interdependent data and thus

Please see figure A2 for a chart of Erikson and Wlezien (2008)’s method applied to the 2008 race.
I have also adapted it for state races in figure 1.

9
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provide more information about the accuracy and information inherent to the different
types of forecasts than four races in different cycles.
The first step in creating a poll‐based forecast is to create a snapshot, which is the
estimated two‐party vote share of the two candidates if the election were held that day.
The Erikson and Wlezien method, labeled as Poll_EW, uses the latest poll at any given
day before the election as its snapshot; for this method, I pool the polls if there are more
than one and use the most recent if there are none that day. The new method, noted as
Poll_Debiased, creates a linear regression of all polls up to that day, and the snapshot is
the trend of that regression.10 FiveThirtyEight weighs all polls by pollster, sample size
and recentness and then adjusts that average for national trends. The snapshot is
completed by adding a regression of expected vote share on demographic and historical
political data, which is weighted heavily in the snapshot only when there is insufficient
polling data available.
The second step in creating a poll‐based forecast is to create a projection, which is
the estimated vote share of the two candidates on Election Day. To create the projection
of both Poll_EW and Poll_Debiased, I regress the final vote share on the poll for each
day before the election in previous election years: V

α

β

e , where y is a given

year and r is a given race. All transformations are optimized with out of sample data:
elections from 2000 and 2004 for the Presidential races and 2004 and 2006 for the
Senatorial races.11 I recover a unique alpha and beta for each day before the election (T),
and the daily projections for 2008 are created using those parameters: V
β P

,

,

α

; the alpha corrects for the anti‐incumbency bias and the beta corrects for

reversion to the mean. For Presidential races, FiveThirtyEight projects the snapshot
Poll aggregators create a snapshot using a combination of averages, linear trends, and/or loess
trends. I use just the linear trend, because it the simplest and most transparent method to create a
consistent poll average on any given day, especially in races with limited number of polls.
11 The data is collected from: PollingReport.com, Pollster.com, and RealClearPolitics.com. Using
the method from Erikson and Wlezien (2002) I fill in missing data, for historical data only, with
the linear interpolation from the poll before and after any missing day.
10
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using historical trends of national poll movement and their correlation to the individual
states. Undecided voters are allocated 50/50 to the major candidates after the third party
probable vote share is taken out. For Senatorial races, FiveThirtyEight uses the snapshot
as the projection.
The third step in creating a poll‐based forecast is to create a probability of
victory, which is the probability that the estimated vote share is greater than 50 percent.
Poll_EW and Poll_Debiased model the vote share on Election Day as a normal
distribution around the projection. For the same projection, the more accurate the
estimation of the projection is, the tighter the distribution, and the greater the percentage
of probable outcomes where the favored candidate has the higher amount of votes.
Mimicking Erikson and Wlezien (2008), Poll_EW assumes that the accuracy of the
projection decreases with the accuracy of the estimated vote totals and the distance of
2008’s poll from the average poll at this point in the election cycle. Thus, the probability
of victory originating from any given day before the election can be estimated as
follows:

Φ

,

determine the optimal sigma (

,

. For Poll_Debiased I use maximum likelihood to

) for each day:

Φ

,

.12 FiveThirtyEight

simulates the data with a Monte Carlo analysis 10,000 times. The simulation accounts
for: sampling error, state‐specific and national movement. The probability of victory is
the percentage of simulations that the candidate gets over 50 percent of the vote.13
The prediction market data, from Intrade, needs to be translated from prices into
probabilities. First, I take the average of the bid and ask for the stock that pays out if the
Democrat wins on Election Day. If the bid‐ask spread is greater than five points, I take

For all of Poll_Debiased’s parameters I use 7 days of data to gain consistency, relative to the
daily random variation in the Erikson and Wlezien model.
13 The formation of FiveThirtyEight’s probability is explained in more detail at:
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/03/frequently‐asked‐questions‐last‐revised.html. It is
possible that it updated its method during the cycle.
12
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the last sale price.14 If there are no active offers and no sales in the last two weeks of the
race, I drop the race; this includes one Presidential race (DC) and eleven Senatorial races
(AL, AR, DE, IA, IL, MI, MT, RI, TN, WY.I, and WY.II).15 The data recovered from these
first two steps I refer to as Raw Intrade. To correct the favorite‐longshot bias I use the
transformation suggested by Leigh et al. (2007):

Φ 1.64 ∗ Φ

.16 I refer to

this forecast as Debiased Intrade.
The five forecasts are compared for their value during the last 130 days of the
cycle (i.e., June 27 through Election Day 2008). The methods for Poll_EW and
Poll_Debiased provide one probability per day; I date a poll as being released the day
after its final day in the field. FiveThirtyEight updated its Presidential probabilities
regularly since March 2008 and published nineteen rounds of forecasts for Senate races. I
use all 14 different rounds of Presidential forecasts that I have been able to obtain and all
19 Senatorial forecasts.17 When FiveThirtyEight is compared directly with any of the
other forecasts, I use the other forecasts’ closest previous forecast. I use Intrade numbers
from noon on each day.18
Figure 1 shows the progression of Poll_EW and Poll_Debiased’s probabilities of
victory for the incumbent party candidate, Republican John McCain, for the national
popular vote over the course of the campaign; the left side of figure 1 demonstrates why
Procedure is adapted from Snowberg et al (2007).
An example of “no active offers” would be an investor willing to buy at 92, but no investor
willing to sell. Eleven of the twelve dropped races have negligible volume for the entire cycle,
with WY.I having twenty outstanding shares, but no additional volume after June and no bid or
ask down the stretch.
16 This transformation was suggested (and estimated) prior to my sample, using data from
Presidential predication markets from 1880 to 2004. The process for determining 1.64 is the same
as my eq. (1) later in the paper. The authors take the inverse normal of all of the prices they
collected and then solve for the coefficient of the data in a probit.
17 The fourteen Presidential forecasts are what Peter McCluskey of the BayesianInvestor.com and
I randomly saved, which are disproportionately later in the cycle. FiveThirtyEight has not
responded to my request for further historical data and it is not available at Archive.org.
18 Unfortunately, there are ten random days where I do not have Intrade data; those days are
dropped from the direct comparisons with Poll_EW and Poll_Debiased.
14
15
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I drop Poll_EW moving forward. The shifts in the underlying probability of victory
cannot justify the volatility in Poll_EW. Thus, Poll_Debiased is specifically created to be
a more realistic and less volatile version of Poll_EW; the chart illustrates how
Poll_Debiased exists near the mean of Poll_EW’s trend. Moreover, as a practical
implication, Poll_EW is so volatile that it is hard to grasp anything else on a graph that
includes it.
The right side of figure 1 is the same as the left side of figure 1, but excludes
Poll_EW and adds Raw and Debiased Intrade’s forecasts as well as annotations of the
major events from the election cycle; this side of the figure illustrates the value of
determining the underlying probability of victory. The chart demonstrates that while
there is strong correlation between the polling and market‐based forecasts (the Intrades
are tied together by construction), there is still considerable variation at points during
the cycle. Both Poll_Debiased and Intrade have McCain moving upward after the
Republican National Convention and the announcement of Sarah Palin as his running
mate, but only Intrade has him crossing the 50 percent threshold (i.e., predicting he wins
the election). Yet, even if there was a consensus on the underlying national values, it is
impossible to determine causality of events on outcomes using national data calibrated
daily; there are too few races, just one every four years, and too many overlapping
events. Thus, extending forecast research to state‐level races is essential to gathering the
data necessary determine some causality or, at minimum, a fuller description of
correlations between events and electoral outcomes. Of course another important reason
for focusing on state‐level races is that the national popular vote does not determine the
winner of the U.S. Presidential election since the election outcome hinges on the results
in fifty‐one individual sovereignties, through the Electoral College.19

There is also evidence that the national popular vote prediction markets may suffer from
manipulation by people motivated to gain publicity for their chosen candidate, but this evidence
does not extend to the state‐level markets.

19
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and the other just below 50 percent.20 Thus, in order to evaluate the forecasts, I need to
examine the distribution of their probabilities, not just whether the favored candidate
won.
The charts in figure 2 show the percentage of the forecasts’ probabilities of
victory for the winning candidate, on a given day before the election, which reach the
following thresholds: >90 percent, >50 percent, and >25 percent. These charts help
illustrate the sources of identification that underlie the subsequent accuracy metric that
will be used to evaluate the different forecasts.
In the Presidential races prior to Labor Day, Intrade is stronger at keeping
predictions for winning candidates >50 percent relative to Poll_Debiased and
FiveThirtyEight, while the forecasts are very competitive after Labor Day (2A). There is
little distinction between the forecasts in the Senatorial races, except for a few
observations, well before Labor Day, where FiveThirtyEight and Intrade have a
persistent difference in their forecast for the special Mississippi Senate race. Between the
poll‐based forecasts, FiveThirtyEight is stronger than Poll_Debiased in forecasts above
50 percent for the Presidential races.
In probabilities above 90 percent FiveThirtyEight is a cautious predictor, moving
toward these more certain probabilities late in the cycle; Poll_Debiased and Debiased
Intrade are similar to each other, with Debiased Intrade showing slightly more confident
probabilities early in the Presidential cycle (2B). Since too few of the candidates with 80–
90 percent probability of victory lose on Election Day, especially for FiveThirtyEight, the
more observations a forecast has >90 percent, the more accurate its depiction of the true
underlying probabilities. FiveThirtyEight’s overly cautious predicting is most extreme in
the Presidential races and persistent, but smaller, in the Senatorial races. All of the
forecasts demonstrate less confidence in their Senatorial versus Presidential predictions.
FiveThirtyEight’s lowest probability of victory for the winning candidate in these disagreeing
observations is 34 percent and Debiased Intrade’s is 30 percent, while their highest is 74 percent
and 80 percent respectively.

20

12

They state probabilities >90 percent less often and increase the percentage of forecasts in
the top thresholds later in the cycle. The relative uncertainty in the Senatorial races is
increased because the Senate accounts for eleven of the twelve highly certain races
dropped due to lack of Intrade data. Due to its favorite‐longshot bias, Raw Intrade has
very few of these extremely confident forecasts.
Debiased Intrade and FiveThirtyEight give the winning candidate little chance to
win earlier in the cycle, and less randomly, than Poll_Debiased. As the cycle progresses
and the amount of potential shocks to the races decrease, fewer and fewer observations
should fail to reach the >25 percent threshold (2C). FiveThirtyEight has some very
wrong predictions in the first half of the cycle, especially in Senatorial races, but refrains
from predicting the winner with <25 percent by mid‐September (at that point any
missed observations are approaching 50 percent). Poll_Debiased, not benefiting from
FiveThirtyEight’s regressions, has very wrong predictions early in the Senatorial and
Presidential cycle and not benefiting from weighing the polls, continues to produce
randomly wrong forecasts much later in the cycle. Yet, toward the middle of the cycle,
FiveThirtyEight and Debiased Intrade both overcompensated for the post‐convention
Republican bounce, where Poll_Debiased benefits from relying only on present polls
and not estimating future movement. With its lack of confidence, Raw Intrade avoids
both extremes and has few extremely wrong predictions, none in the Senatorial races.
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The most interesting forecasts are in races in which the outcome is not‐certain
and for subsequent analysis I define observations with probabilities >90 percent as
observations where the forecasts are in the “certain” range.21 In all of FiveThirtyEight
and Debiased Intrade’s forecasts, just 0.27 percent of candidates lost when they were
predicted to win with >90% probability.22 In many respects these certain races are not as
important to the observers of elections because they are perceived as decided races and,
thus, distinctions between the forecasts are more arbitrary, as there are fewer polls and
fewer participants in the prediction markets. Most races eventually become certain by
the end of the campaign. For example, on Election Eve FiveThirtyEight had just seven
Presidential contests that were not >90 percent probability of victory for one candidate:
FL, IN, MO, MT, NC, ND, and OH. On the earliest day in my sample FiveThirtyEight
had twenty‐four Presidential races that were not >90 percent.23
Figure 3 shows the progression of the forecasts for the probability of victory for
the winning candidate in four individual contests which were chosen to demonstrate
persistent trends that contribute to the aggregated accuracy of the forecasts. First, the
two North Carolina races highlight the fact that using a 50 percent threshold as an
accuracy benchmark would miss critical information in the forecast because the forecasts
cross the 50 percent line nearly in tandem. Second, the charts show that Poll_Debiased
and Debiased Intrade are generally quicker to cross over into the >90 percent range than
FiveThirtyEight. Further, they both show more confidence than FiveThirtyEight in the
expected and eventual winner, on average, in races like the North Carolina Presidential

Any finding in this paper relating to the 90 percent line is robust to nearby probabilities.
FiveThirtyEight and Debiased Intrade have nineteen observations, out of over 9,500 total
observations, where they give >90 percent probability of victory to the eventual losing candidate.
These observations are in the NC Presidential and Senatorial races and the IN Presidential race.
The only observation where both FiveThirtyEight and Debiased Intrade gave the eventual winner
a less than 10 percent probability is NC’s Presidential race two days before Lehman collapsed.
23 On Election Eve, FiveThirtyEight had just 3 Senate race where there was not >90 percent
probability of victory for one candidate: GA, MN, and NC. On the earliest day in my sample
FiveThirtyEight had twelve Senate races that were not >90 percent.
21
22
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race, which are still uncertain on Election Day. Third, while Debiased Intrade is a little
less likely to get severely wrong predictions than FiveThirtyEight, both of them bottom
out badly about a week after the Republican National Convention, as shown in the two
North Carolina races. Fourth, Raw Intrade is the most conservative; it avoids large
mistakes, but also shows less confidence in certain races. Fifth, I generally find that
Debiased Intrade slightly trails the poll‐based forecasts in the most certain races, such as
the New Mexico Senate race.
The races in figure 3 also illustrate that the larger or most persistent differences
between the forecasts do not necessarily come from the more competitive races or the
even the biggest moments a race. First, margin of victory does not necessarily determine
if the race was certain or uncertain during the course of the cycle. Democrat Kay Hagen
easily won the North Carolina Senate race with 53 percent of the vote over Republican
Elizabeth Dole’s 44 percent of the vote (a 0.087 margin). Yet, despite this comfortable
margin of victory, the race was far from certain to forecasters for most of the cycle. By
comparison (not shown) forecasters (and most observers) forecast McCain to carry his
home state of Arizona with >90 percent probability throughout most of the cycle, even
though he won with a margin of 0.086, a slightly smaller margin than the Democrat’s
victory in North Carolina’s Senate race. Second, the uncertain races do not necessarily
provide much identification in terms of absolute difference. North Carolina was a
competitive state through the entire Presidential campaign, with Barack Obama
squeaking out a win with a tiny 0.003 margin of victory. But even though North
Carolina was an uncertain for the entire campaign, the different forecasts never stray too
far apart. In contrast, New Jersey, long a Democratic stronghold in Presidential politics,
was easily won by Barack Obama 57 percent to McCain’s 42 percent (a 0.157 margin).
Despite this large margin of victory, the absolute difference between the forecasts is
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accuracy of the forecasts, does this.25 The square error is 1

, where

is for the winning candidate. A strategic forecaster maximizes his score,
in expectation, by forecasting his true belief. To illustrate what the attributes of the
scoring rule mean in this article, in the lower half of the certain range only 1 percent of
Debiased Intrade’s 1,013 forecasts between 90–95 percent lose, and 2 percent of
FiveThirtyEight’s; thus both forecasts, Debiased Intrade more than FiveThirtyEight,
should be more confident with these observations (i.e., move the probability of victory
for the chosen candidate closer to 98 or 99 percent). Yet, more heavily weighted by MSE
is that 11 percent of Debiased Intrade’s probabilities between 80–90 percent lose, while
only 7 percent of FiveThirtyEight’s probabilities lose in that range (i.e., as illustrated in
figures 2 and 3, FiveThirtyEight is leaving many observations in the 80–90 percent range
that should be in the 90–100 percent range).
For presidential races, as shown in figure 4, Debiased Intrade has a statistically
significant smaller mean square error relative to the poll‐based forecasts until mid‐
September and then continues to have smaller errors until the end of the cycle. 26 The
figure charts the mean difference in square error for the two poll‐based forecasts relative
to Debiased Intrade in the Presidential races; anything above zero indicates a more
accurate mean forecast for Debiased Intrade. In the beginning of the cycle, Debiased
Intrade is slightly besting FiveThirtyEight in races of all degrees of certainty, while it is
beating Poll_Debiased on the most uncertain races and doing similarly for the vast

Please see supplementary data online (figures A5 and A6) for charts regarding an alternative
approach, the mean difference of the absolute error (MAE), 1
. This scoring
rule rewards a forecaster equally if he forecasts 75 to 70 percent as it would if he forecasts 95 to 90
percent. Thus, a strategic forecaster can maximize his expected score by stating 100 percent
probability for any candidate with >50 percent probability of victory. So while MSE is driven by
the distinctions in the important and precisely calibrated observations, MAE, especially later in
the cycle, is driven by the differences among less important and less precisely calculated
observations.
26 While I view the standard errors as a lower bound, due to issues involving the independence of
the forecasts, I believe that the statistical significance is still a meaningful guide to the degree of
differences between the different forecasts.
25
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majority of races. This translates into a modest advantage over FiveThirtyEight and a
commanding lead over Poll_Debiased, as MSE puts more emphasis on uncertain
observations. Toward the middle of the cycle, Poll_Debiased is able to pull ahead of
Debiased Intrade, because Debiased Intrade and FiveThirtyEight were making a few
massive mistakes in this time period. Finally, toward the end of the cycle, Debiased
Intrade has a slight advantage over FiveThirtyEight; the main identification at the end is
Debiased Intrade having more confidence in the not‐certain races and FiveThirtyEight
demonstrating more confidence in the most certain races. Poll_Debiased falls far behind
the other forecasts, because it is the only one still making massively wrong predictions. I
only show the chart with Debiased Intrade, because it is the more accurate of the two
prediction market forecasts. Please see figure A3 for the chart comparing the Raw
Intrade and Debiased poll forecasts. Raw Intrade does not make big mistakes in the most
uncertain observations, which helps it have a statistically insignificant, but smaller error
than the poll‐based forecasts for the first half of the cycle. Lacking confidence in most
certain races, it falls behind the poll‐based forecasts in the second half of the cycle,
consistent with the findings of Erikson and Wlezien (2008). Yet, figure 4 shows that
debiasing Intrade creates a forecast with a statistically significant smaller mean square
error relative to the poll‐based forecasts in Presidential races, especially earlier in the
cycle.
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favoring one side versus the other or there was a 2008 specific shock in one direction
(i.e., the forecast would be more accurate if it systematically moved all of the predictions
in one direction). I ran both tables 1 and 2 twice, with the incumbent candidate and then
the Republican candidate as the dependent variable; since the results are almost
identical I only show the incumbent party candidate as the dependent variable. I do not
show any of the results for Raw Intrade, because they are the exactly the same as
Debiased Intrade, just multiplied by 1.64.
I have almost all negative and significant constants (rows c, f), which indicates all
of the forecasts would have benefited from systematically adding a few points in the
direction of the non‐incumbent candidate for all of their probabilities. This result is not
surprising. All of the transformations are fitted for prior elections, so constants will be
significant if 2008 systemically differs from recent years, which it did. Almost every
uncertain race broke toward the Democrat or the non‐incumbent. While an imperfect
arbitrator of uncertainty through the 130 days prior to the election, seven of nine races
that were decided by 5 points or less went to the Democrat or non‐incumbent.
All of the forecasts are under‐confident, but FiveThirtyEight is much more
under‐confident than Debiased Intrade and Debiased Intrade is much more under‐
confident than Poll_Debiased. FiveThirtyEight’s under‐confidence was evident in the
earlier analysis in that their predictions left many probabilities short of the >90 percent
category well later than other forecasts. For Intrade, it means that the transformation
suggested by Leigh et al. was not strong enough for 2008 and that Intrade would have
been most accurate if the transformation coefficient was 2.72 versus 1.64.27
Poll_Debiased’s relatively small need for additional confidence is also evident in figures
2 and 3, where it is relatively aggressive in placing observations above 90 percent.

27

Since Debiased Intrade’s 1

1.660, Raw Intrade’s 1

1.660 ∗ 1.64

2.72.
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Table 1. Coefficients from Probit of Winner on Forecasts, where the dependent
variable is
Panel I: Poll_Debiased and Intrade
0.320*
(0.143)

(a) Poll_Debiased
(b) Debiased Intrade

‐0.785*
(0.247)
8,361

(c) Constant
Observations

0.659*
(0.250)
‐0.824*
(0.364)
8,361

Panel II: FiveThirtyEight and Intrade
0.936*
(0.278)

(d) FiveThirtyEight
(e) Debiased Intrade

‐0.814*
(0.346)
1,156

(f) Constant
Observations

0.662*
(0.232)
‐0.536
(0.353)
1,156

Notes: (Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered by race: 74 total) * denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level.

Reported in table 2 are the results from a simple binary test in the spirit of Fair
and Shiller (1989 and 1990) to examine whether the forecasts provide unique
information from each other:



(2) I (Win) r    0  1 *  1 ( Intrade) s ,t   2 *  1 ( PollForecast ) r ,t



Whereas the earlier analysis compared the accuracy of the forecasts as they were
reported, the results here explore the accuracy of the forecasts, but with an optimal
manipulation of the information they provide. The coefficients adjust for any issues in
the confidence and bias of the forecasts. This is akin to asking if I were to make a new
forecast, optimally combining the forecasts in this study as my raw information, how
much of each forecast would be used. There are two things to consider when examining
these results: the relative size of coefficients illustrates the weight placed on each
forecast and the statistical significance confirms if I can reject that one forecast
23

encompasses all of the useful information in the other. I run this probit for all
observations, just observations occurring before Labor Day, and dropping all
observations where both forecasts are >90 percent.
I can reject the possibility that Intrade (rows b, e) contains no independently
valuable information but I cannot reject, under most circumstances, the possibility that
all of FiveThirtyEight (row d) or Poll_Debiased’s (row a) information is encompassed by
Intrade. In the only category where Intrade is not significant at the 5 percent level, it is
significant at the 10 percent level. FiveThirtyEight is never significant and Poll_Debiased
is significant only in the all observations category. If I were to make a joint forecast, I
would heavily emphasize Debiased Intrade and may be just as accurate without either
of the poll‐based forecasts.
Table 2. Coefficients from Probit of Winner on Forecasts, where the dependent
variable is
All Observations

Before Labor Day

Not‐Certain Races^

Panel I: Poll_Debiased and Intrade
(a) Poll_Debiased
(b) Debiased Intrade
(c) Constant
Observations

0.451*
(0.214)
1.253*
(0.369)
‐0.941*
(0.350)
8,361

0.267
(0.228)
1.407*
(0.428)
‐0.915*
(0.393)
4,354

0.357
(0.219)
1.153*
(0.364)
‐0.894*
(0.310)
3,167

Panel II: FiveThirtyEight and Intrade
(d) FiveThirtyEight
(e) Debiased Intrade
(f) Constant
Observations

0.846
(0.456)
0.981*
(0.418)
‐0.714*
(0.356)
1,156

0.514
(0.602)
1.170
(0.643)
‐0.763
(0.458)
268

0.774
(0.495)
0.960*
(0.423)
‐0.690*
(0.341)
380

Notes: (Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered by race: 74 total) * denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level.
^I drop races where both forecasts are >90% probability. Roughly two‐thirds of the remaining
observations occur after Labor Day.
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V.

Conclusion
In 2008, FiveThirtyEight, a debiased poll‐based forecast, offered to the general

public a more accurate forecast than raw poll numbers or raw prediction market prices.
But, the analysis here shows that were Intrade’s prices debiased, they would have
provided a more accurate forecast and more valuable information than the best poll‐
based forecasts currently available, especially early in the cycle and in uncertain races.
An examination of the structure of these forecasts helps explain this informational
advantage.
There are three main components to a forecast: the raw information being
aggregated, the transformation of this information into probabilistic forecasts, and any
bias that shifts the stated forecasts.
As to information, the raw information used by the poll‐based forecasts is public
and hence should be in the information set of Intrade investors. Beyond this, prediction
markets aggregate dispersed and unpublished information (i.e., a brewing scandal may
be known to a few investors before the general public). Also, prediction markets are
capable of incorporating new information in real‐time, whereas poll‐based forecasts take
several days for information to saturate (i.e., a publicly‐known event is immediately
incorporated into the stock price, but it will take several days before it is fully
incorporated into the polls). Further, prediction market stocks are based on the value of
the candidates on Election Day; thus, investors are incorporating their information on
how it will affect the race on Election Day, while poll‐based forecasts are only able to
debias the information based off of previous cycles (i.e., investors can discount a bump
in the polls generated by the visit of a popular leader, but poll‐based forecasts can only
discount the bump if it happened regularly, at the same time, in previous cycles).
FiveThirtyEight supplements its forecasts with its historical regressions when there are
few polls, which mitigates the true disadvantage of forecasting with only polls.
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As to transformations, the poll‐based forecasts have sophisticated methods for
transforming information into probabilities. Investors in Intrade vary in their methods of
converting information into subjective probabilities and then those probabilities are
aggregated by the certainty of the investors. Only a small percentage of the investors
will be as sophisticated as the poll‐based forecasters and there is no guarantee that they
will be the most certain of the investors. As to reporting biases, it is now possible to
correct for biases in reporting or look past the biases for the informational content of the
forecast.
Since the informational advantage of Intrade’s forecasts is not derived from more
sophisticated transformations or less biased reporting, it must originate from higher
informational content in its raw data. The results of this analysis, and increased
knowledge about the structure of these forecasts, can be utilized to make stronger
market‐based forecasts as well as stronger poll‐based forecasts, both inside and outside
of politics.
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Forecasting Elections:
Voter Intentions versus Expectations
(Article is co‐authored with Justin Wolfers)

Abstract
In this paper, we explore the value of an underutilized political polling question:
who do you think will win the upcoming election? We demonstrate that this
expectation question points to the winning candidate more often than the standard
political polling question of voter intention: if the election were held today, who would
you vote for? Further, the results of the expectation question translate into more
accurate forecasts of the vote share and probability of victory than the ubiquitous intent
question. This result holds, even if we generate forecasts with the expectations of only
Democratic voters or only Republican voters and compare those forecasts to forecasts
created with the full sample of intentions. Our structural interpretation of the
expectation question shows that every response is equivalent to a multi‐person poll of
intention; the power of the response is that it provides information about the
respondent’s intent, as well as the intent of her friends and family. This paper has far
reaching implications for all disciplines that use polling.

I.

Introduction
Since the advent of scientific polling in the 1930s, political pollsters have asked

people whom they intend to vote for; occasionally, they have also asked who they think
will win. Our task in this paper is long overdue: we ask which of these questions yields
more accurate forecasts. That is, we contrast the predictive power of the questions
probing voter intention with questions probing expectation. Judging by the attention paid
by pollsters, the press, and campaigns, the conventional wisdom appears to be that polls
of voter intention are more accurate than polls of voter expectation.
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Yet there are good reasons to believe that the expectation question is more
informative. Survey respondents may possess much more information about the
upcoming political race than the voting intention question allows them to answer. At a
minimum, they know their own current voting intention, so the information set feeding
into their expectation will be at least as rich as that captured by the voting intention
question. But beyond this, they may also have information about the current voting
intentions, both preference and probability of voting, of their friends and family. So too,
they have some sense of the likelihood that today’s expressed intention will be changed
before it ultimately becomes an Election Day vote. Our research is motivated by idea
that the richer information embedded in this expectation data may yield more accurate
forecasts.
We find robust evidence that expectation‐based forecasts yield more accurate
predictions of election outcomes. By comparing the performance of these two questions
only when they are asked in exactly the same survey, we effectively difference out the
influence of other factors. Our primary dataset consists of all of the Presidential
Electoral College races from 1952 to 2008, where both the intention and expectation
question are asked. In 268 of the 345 polls, either both the intention and expectation
question point to the winner or neither does. But in the 77 cases in which one points to
the winner and the other does not, the expectation question points to the winner 60
times, while the intention question points to the winner only 17 times. That is, 78% of
the time that these two approaches disagree, the expectation data is correct. We can also
assess the relative accuracy of the two methods by assessing the extent to which each
can be informative in forecasting the vote share and the probability of victory; we find
that relying on voter expectation rather than intention data yield substantial and
statistically significant increases in forecasting accuracy. Our findings remain robust to
correcting for an array of known biases in voter intention data.
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The better performance of forecasts created with expectation question, versus
intention question, data varies somewhat, depending on the specific context. The
expectation‐based question is particularly valuable when small samples are involved.
The intuition for this result comes from a simple thought experiment. In our primary
dataset, we have 13,208 individual respondents providing their intention and
expectation in 345 different races; 58.0% of respondents intend to vote for the winning
candidate, while 68.5% expect that candidate to win. Thus, if we survey only one voter,
expectation will outperform intention 10.5% of the time. It is unclear ex‐ante which type
of question relatively benefits from increases in the days before the election, although
both are less accurate as less information is available.
One strand of literature this paper addresses is the emerging documentation that
prediction markets tend to yield more accurate forecasts than polls (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz, 2004; Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2008). More recently, Rothschild (2009) has
updated these findings in light of the 2008 Presidential and Senate races, showing that
forecasts based on prediction markets yielded systematically more accurate forecasts of
the likelihood of Obama winning each state than did the forecasts based on aggregated
intention polls compiled by the website FiveThirtyEight.com and another more
transparent intention poll‐based forecast created by the author. One hypothesis for this
superior performance is that prediction markets—by asking traders to bet on
outcomes—effectively ask a different question, eliciting the expectations rather than
intentions of participants. If correct, this suggests that much of the accuracy of
prediction markets could be obtained simply by polling voters on their expectations,
rather than intentions.
These results also speak to yet another strand of research, the historical question
about the value of scientific polling and representative samples (Robinson, 1937). Begun
prior to the advent of scientific polling and renewed most recently with the rise of
cellphones as well as use of online survey panels, this debate is again of contemporary
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significance. Surveys of voting intentions rely heavily on polling representative cross‐
sections of the electorate. By contrast, as we demonstrate in this paper, surveys of voter
expectation can still be quite accurate, even when drawn from non‐representative
samples. Again, the logic of this claim comes from the difference between asking about
expectations, which should not systematically differ across demographic groups, and
asking about intentions, which should. Again, the connection to prediction markets is
useful, as Berg and Rietz (2006) shows that these have yielded accurate forecasts, despite
drawing from an unrepresentative pool of overwhelmingly white, male, highly
educated, high income, self‐selected traders.
While direct voter expectation questions about electoral outcomes have been
virtually ignored by political forecasters, they have received some interest from
psychologists. In particular, Granberg and Brent (1983) document wishful thinking, in
which people’s expectation about what will occur is positively correlated with what they
want to happen. Thus, people who intend to vote Republican are also more likely to
predict a Republican victory. This same correlation is also consistent with voters
preferring the candidate they think will win, as in bandwagon effects, or gaining utility
from being optimistic. We re‐interpret this correlation through a rational lens, in which
the respondents know their own voting intention with certainty and have knowledge
about the voting intentions of their friends and family. Insights from this structural
interpretation of the data both explain the power of the expectation data and, by
revealing the relationship between intention and expectation, may help us identify even
more efficient translations of these two sets of raw data into the underlying values of the
election.
More accurate forecasts will provide researchers a tool for capturing the impact
of campaigns on elections; this is currently a difficult question to address, as there is
great variation in both the slope and values of currently utilized forecasts of elections.
Our method will also allow for forecasts of campaigns that are currently too difficult or
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costly to poll. Beyond understanding the effect of campaigns on elections, the findings
in this paper are important as forecasts affect races, as resources are allocated by the
progress of the campaign (Mutz, 1995), and voters themselves act strategically in certain
contexts (Irwin and Holsteyn, 2002). Political forecasts also have consequences beyond
politics, as individual companies and markets react to the probability of different
outcomes (Imai and Shelton, 2010).
We believe that our findings have substantial applicability in other forecasting
contexts. Market researchers ask variants of the voter intention question in an array of
contexts; as they read this paper, they can seamlessly substitute a product launch in
place of an election, the preference for one product over another in place of voter
intention, and the consumer expectation of sales for one product over another in place of
voter expectation. Likewise, indices of consumer confidence are partly based on the
stated purchasing intentions of consumers, rather than their expectations about the
purchase conditions for their community. The same insight that motivated our study—
that people also have information on the plans of others—is also likely relevant in these
other contexts. Thus, it seems plausible that other types of research may also benefit
from paying greater attention to people’s expectations than to their intentions.
In Section II, we describe our first cut of the data, illustrating the relative success
of the two approaches to predicting the winner of elections. In Section III, we create a
naïve translation of the raw data into forecasts of vote share. In Section IV, we generate
a more efficient translation of the raw data into forecasts of vote share. In Section V, we
determine the accuracy of the polls in creating probabilities of victory. In Section VI, we
test our forecasts with 2008 data. In Section VII, we examine the accuracy of
expectation‐based forecasts produced with non‐random samples of respondents. In
Section VIII, we assess the methods derived in this paper from the primary data source,
on a secondary data source. In Section IX, we provide a structural interpretation of the
response to the expectation question.
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II.

Simple Forecasting of the Winner
Our primary dataset consists of the American National Election Studies (ANES)

cumulative data file. In particular, we are interested in responses to two questions:
Voter Intention: Who do you think you will vote for in the election for President?
Voter Expectation: Who do you think will be elected President in November?
These questions are typically asked one month prior to the election. Throughout
this paper, we treat elections as two‐party races, and so discard responses involving
professed intention to vote for or expectation of victory for third‐party candidates. In
order to keep the sample sizes comparable, we only keep respondents with valid
responses to both the intention and expectation questions and adjust the individual
response with the ANES provided weights. When we describe the “winner” of an
election, we are thinking about the outcome that most interests forecasters, which is who
takes office (and so we describe George W. Bush as the winner of the 2000 election,
despite his losing the popular vote).
At the national level, both questions have been asked since 1952, and to give a
sense of the basic patterns, we summarize these data in Table 1.

Table 1: Forecasting the Winner of the Presidential Races

Year

Race

Actual
%Intended %Reported
%Expect
result:
to vote for voting for
the winner
% voting
winner
winner
for winner

N

1952

Eisenhower beat
Stevenson

56.0%

56.0%

58.6%

55.4%

1,135

1956

Eisenhower beat
Stevenson

76.4%

59.2%

60.6%

57.8%

1,161

1960 Kennedy beat Nixon

45.0%

45.0%

48.4%

50.1%

716

1964 Johnson beat Goldwater

91.0%

74.1%

71.3%

61.3%

1,087
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1968 Nixon beat Humphrey

71.2%

56.0%

55.5%

50.4%

844

1972 Nixon beat McGovern

92.5%

69.7%

68.7%

61.8%

1,800

1976 Carter beat Ford

52.6%

51.4%

50.3%

51.1%

1,320

1980 Reagan beat Carter

46.3%

49.5%

56.5%

55.3%

870

1984 Reagan beat Mondale

87.9%

59.8%

59.9%

59.2%

1,582

1988

GHW Bush beat
Dukakis

72.3%

53.1%

55.3%

53.9%

1,343

1992

Clinton beat GHW
Bush

65.2%

60.8%

61.5%

53.5%

1,541

1996 Clinton beat Dole

89.6%

63.8%

60.1%

54.7%

1,274

2000 GW Bush beat Gore

47.4%

45.7%

47.0%

49.7%

1,245

2004 GW Bush beat Kerry

67.9%

49.2%

51.6%

51.2%

921

2008 Obama beat McCain

65.7%

56.6%

56.5%

53.7%

1,632

68.5%

56.7%

54.6%

57.5%

18,471

Simple Average:

Notes: Table summarizes authors’ calculations, based on data from the American National
Election Studies, 1952‐2008. Sample restricted to respondents whose responses to both the
expectation and intention questions listed the two major candidates.

Each method can be used to generate a forecast of the most likely winner, and so
we begin by assessing how often the majority response to each question correctly picked
the winner. The first column with data on Table 1 shows that the winning Presidential
candidate was expected to win by a majority of respondents in 12 of the 15 elections,
missing Kennedy’s narrow victory in 1960, Reagan’s election in 1980, and G.W. Bush’s
controversial win in 2000. The more standard voter intention question performed
similarly, correctly picking the winning candidate in one fewer election. The only
election in which the two approaches pointed to different candidates was 2004, in which
a majority of respondents correctly expected that Bush would win, while a majority
intended to vote for Kerry. So far we have been analyzing data from the pre‐election
interviews. In the third column we summarize data from post‐election interviews which
also ask which candidate each respondent ultimately voted for. The data in this column
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reveal the influence of sampling error, as a majority of the people sampled in 1960 and
2000 ultimately did vote for the losing candidate.
The last line of this table summarizes, and on average, 68.5% of all voters
correctly expected the winner of the Presidential election, while 56.7% intended to vote
for the winner. These averages give a hint as to the better performance of expectation‐
based forecasts. Taken literally, they say that if one forecasted election outcomes based
on a random sample of one person in each election, asking about voter expectations
would predict the winner 68.5% of the time, compared to 56.7%, when asking about
voter intentions. More generally, in small polls, sampling error likely plays a larger role
in determining whether a majority of respondents intend to vote for the election winner,
than in whether they correctly forecast the winner. We will develop this insight at much
greater length, in section IV.
The analysis in Table 1 does not permit strong conclusions, and indeed, it
highlights two important analytic difficulties. First, we have very few national
Presidential elections, and so the data will permit only noisy inferences. Second, our
outcome measure—asking whether a method correctly forecasted the winner—is a very
coarse measure of the forecasting ability of either approach to polling. Thus, we will
proceed in two directions. First, we will exploit a much larger number of elections by
analyzing data from the same surveys on who respondents expect to win the Electoral
College votes of their state. And second, we will proceed to analyzing the forecasting
performance of each approach against other measures: their ability to match the two‐
party preferred vote share and their forecast of the probability of victory.
We begin with the state‐by‐state analysis, analyzing responses to the state‐
specific voter expectation question:
Voter Expectation (state level): How about here in [state]. Which candidate for President do
you think will carry this state?
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We compare responses to this question with the voter intention question described
above. Before presenting the data, there are four limitations of these data worth noting.
First, the ANES does not survey people in every state, and so in each wave, around 35
states are represented. Second, this question was not asked in the 1956‐68 and 2000
election waves. We do not expect either of these issues to bias our results toward
favoring either intention‐ or expectation‐based forecasts. Third, the sample sizes in each
state can be small. Across each of these state elections, the average sample size is only
38 respondents, and the sample size in a state ranges from 1 to 246. In section IV we will
see that this is an important issue, as the expectation‐based forecasts are relatively
stronger in small samples. Fourth, while the ANES employs an appropriate sampling
frame for collecting nationally representative data, it is not the frame that one would
design were one interested in estimating state‐specific aggregates, as these samples
typically involve no more than a few Primary Sampling Units. Despite these limitations,
this data still presents an interesting laboratory for testing the relative efficacy of
intention versus expectation‐based polling. All told we have valid ANES data from 10
election cycles (1952, 1972‐1996, and 2004‐2008), and in each cycle, we have data from
between 28 and 40 states, for a final sample size of 345 races.28
Table 2 summarizes the performance of our two questions at forecasting the
winning Presidential candidate in each state. Again, we use a very coarse performance
metric, simply scoring the proportion of races in which the candidate who won a
majority in the relevant poll ultimately won in that state; the voter expectation question
is the first column with data and the usual voter intention question is the second column
with data. (When a poll yields a fifty‐fifty split, we score it as half of a correct call.) All
told, the voter expectation question predicted the winner in 279 of these 345 races,
compared with 239 correct calls for the voter intention question. A simple difference in

Only the 311 pre‐2008 elections are used in Sections III, IV, and V to test and calibrate our
models. Section VI then runs the model, with coefficients created with pre‐2008 data, on 2008
data.
28
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proportions test reveals that these differences are clearly statistically significant (z=3.63).
Of course the forecast errors of each approach may be correlated across states within an
election cycle, and so a more conservative approach would note that the voter
expectation question outperformed the voter intent question in 8 of the 10 election cycles
and tied in 2008. The difference in that tenth cycle (1972) was that Nixon won a tight
race in Minnesota. More to the point, this difference in forecasting performance is large.

Table 2: Forecasting the Presidential Election, by State

Year

Proportion of states where the winning
candidate was correctly predicted by a
majority of respondents to:

Number of states
surveyed

Expectation question

Intention question

1952

74.3%

58.6%

35

1972

97.4%

100%

38

1976

80.3%

77.6%

38

1980

57.7%

41.0%

39

1984

86.7%

68.3%

30

1988

88.3%

56.7%

30

1992

89.4%

77.3%

33

1996

75.0%

67.5%

40

2004

89.3%

67.9%

28

2008

76.5%

76.5%

34

279 of 345 correct
80.9%
(3.8)

239 of 345 correct
69.3%
(5.4)

Difference:
11.6%***
(3.2)

Totals:
Average:
(Standard error)

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by year).

At this point, our analysis has been quite crude—only analyzing whether the
favored candidate won. This approach has the virtue of transparency, but it leaves
much of the variation in the data—such as variation in the winning margin—
unexamined. Thus we now turn to analyzing the accuracy of the forecasted vote shares
derived from both intention and expectation data. We will also add some structure to
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how we are thinking about these data. At this point we drop 2008 from the dataset, in
order to have some “out of‐sample” data to review in Section VI.

III.

Simple (or Naïve) Forecasting of Vote Share
Our goal is to use the state‐by‐state ANES data to come up with forecasts of the

two‐party vote share in each of the

state×year races in our dataset. In this section, we

analyze the data the way they are typically used—interpreting a poll that says that
percent of sample respondents will vote for a candidate in state‐year race as a
forecast that this candidate will win

percent of votes among the entire population.

That is, we follow the norm among pollsters and make our projections as if the sample
moments represent population proportions. Likewise, we interpret a poll that says that
percent of sample respondents expect a candidate to win as a forecast that

percent

of the population expect that candidate to win. While this may sound obvious, in fact
raw polling data rarely represent optimal forecasts. Thus, we refer to the projections in
this section as “naïve forecasts”, and in section IV we will describe how our raw polling
data can be adjusted to create efficient forecasts.
Our focus is on predicting each candidate’s share of the two‐party vote, and we
begin by analyzing data on voter intention. Figure 1 plots the relationship between the
actual Democratic vote share in each state‐year race, and the proportion of poll
respondents who plan to vote for the Democratic candidate. There are two features of
these data to notice. First, election outcomes and voter expectations are clearly
positively correlated—that is, these polls are informative. But second, the relationship is
by no means one‐for‐one, and these relatively small polls of voter intention are only a
noisy measure of the true vote share on Election Day.
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Figure 1: Naïve Voter Intention Forecast and Actual Vote Share
1.0 Root Mean Square Error = 0.151

Actual Democratic Vote Share: Vr

Mean Absolute Error = 0.115
0.9 Correlation = 0.571
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
45-degree line

0.0
0.0

0.1

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Proportion Who Intend to Vote Democratic: Vr(hat)

0.9

1.0

Notes: Each point shows a separate state‐year cell in a Presidential Electoral College election; the
size of each point is proportional to the number of survey respondents. Both voter intention and
election outcomes refer to shares of the total votes cast for the two major parties. There are a total
of n=311 elections, as the 2008 data is not included.

In Figure 2 we show the relationship between voter expectations—the share of
voters who expect the Democrat to win that state’s presidential ballot—and the vote
share he actually garnered. This plot reveals that there is a close relationship between
election outcomes and voter expectations, and typically the candidate who most
respondents expect to win, does in fact win. That is, most of the data lie in either the
Northeast or Southwest quadrants, a fact also evident in Table 2. Equally, the
relationship between voter expectations and vote shares does not appear to be linear.
Indeed, it should seem obvious that a statement that two‐thirds of voters expect Obama
to win does not—without adding further structure—immediately correspond to any
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particular forecast about his likely vote share. Thus we now turn to assessing how to
tease out the forecast of vote shares implicit in these data.

Figure 2: Voter Expectation and Actual Vote Share
1.0

Actual Democratic Vote Share: Vr

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0 Dashed line shows 0.5+0.150*InvNormal(Xr(hat))
0.0

0.1

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Proportion Who Expect the Democrat to Win: Xr(hat)

0.9

1.0

We begin by characterizing how people respond to the question probing their
expectations about the likely winner. If each poll respondent views an unbiased noisy
signal,

∗

of a candidate’s final vote share—where the superscript serves as a

reminder that we are analyzing individual responses, and the asterisk reminds us that
this is an unobserved latent variable—then:
∗

and

~

0,

[1]
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where

is an idiosyncratic error reflecting the respondent’s imperfect observation.29

We assume that this noise term is drawn from a normal distribution, and its variance is
constant across both poll respondents, and across elections. In turn, if poll respondents
describe themselves as expecting a specific candidate to win if this noisy signal suggests
that this candidate will win at least half the vote, then we will observe voter expectations
as follows:
1
0

∗

0.5

∗

0.5

[2]

Consequently the probability that an individual respondent says that they expect
a candidate to win is Φ

.

, where Φ ∙ is the standard normal cumulative

distribution function. That is, equations [1] and [2] together imply that we can estimate
from a simple probit regression explaining whether the respondent expected a
candidate to win, by a variable describing the extent by which the vote share garnered
by that candidate exceeds the 50% required to win:
1

0.5

[3]

This regression yields an estimate of 1/

6.661 with a standard error allowing

for within‐state‐year correlated errors of 0.385 (n=11,548), which implies that

0.150,

with a standard error of 0.0089 (estimated using the delta method). For now, we simply
note that this estimate provides a link between election results, and the proportion of the
population who expect the Democrat to win,
0.5

Φ

:
0.5

Part of this error may be due to the fact that the election is still a month away; thus
variation due to voters who may later change their minds.

29

[4]

includes
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When the voting population is large then the noise induced by
between the population parameters
Φ

and

in the mapping

is negligible, 30 and so it follows that:

0.5

[5]

From this, we can back out the implied expected vote share by inverting this function:
|

0.5

σΦ

[6]

This function is also shown as a dashed line in Figure 2, based on our estimated
value of

0.150. To be clear, this is the appropriate mapping only if we know the

true population proportion who expect a particular candidate to win,

. While this

assumption is clearly false, our goal here is to provide a forecast comparable to the naïve
forecast of voter intentions, and so in both cases we use the mapping between survey
proportions and forecasts that would be appropriate in the absence of sampling
variation. Indeed, in Figure 2 many of the extreme values of the proportion of voters
expecting a candidate to win likely reflect sampling variation. That is, our
transformation of voter expectations data into vote shares is clearly not estimated as a
line of best fit, as elections are rarely as lopsided as the dashed line suggests. This
feature roughly parallels the observation that in Figure 1; elections are rarely as lopsided
as suggested by small samples of voter intentions. We will explore this feature of the
data in greater detail in the next section when we evaluate efficient shrinkage‐based
estimators. But for now we will call this simple transformation of voter expectation our
“naïve” expectation‐based forecast.
The one remaining difficulty is that in 22 races (7 percent of races), either 0% or
100% of survey respondents expect the Democrat to win, and so equation [6] does not
yield a specific forecast. In these cases we (somewhat arbitrarily) infer that the

As we will see in the next section, the noise term is relevant to the mapping between the
population parameter and the sample estimate .
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candidate is expected to win 20% or 80% of the vote, respectively.31 Given the extreme
nature of these inferences, we regard these assumptions as unfavorable to the
expectations‐based forecast. Even so, we obtain qualitatively similar results when
imputing expected vote shares of 0% and 100% instead. (Section IV provides a more
satisfactory treatment of this issue.)
Figure 3 plots our naïve expectations‐based forecasts of vote shares against the
actual election results. These forecasts are clustered along the 45‐degree line, suggesting
that they are quite accurate.

Figure 3: Naïve Expectation‐Based Forecast and Actual Vote Share
1.0 Root Mean Square Error = 0.089

Mean Absolute Error = 0.067

Actual Democratic Vote Share: Vr

0.9 Correlation = 0.757
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
45-degree line

0.0
0.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Naive Expectation-Based Forecast: 0.5+0.150*InvNormal(Xr(hat))
Based on Proportion Who Expect the Democrat to Win

1.0

Our rationale was simply that these are the nearest round numbers that ensure that the implied
forecast is monotonic in the proportion of respondents expecting a particular candidate to win.
(Across the 289 other elections, the minimum was 24% and the maximum was 76%.)
31
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In Table 3 we provide several simple comparisons of forecast accuracy. The first
two rows show that the expectation‐based forecast yields both a root mean squared
error and mean absolute error that is significantly less than the intention‐based forecast.
The third row shows that the expectation‐based forecast is also the more accurate
forecast in 65% of these elections. The significance in these advantages for expectation‐
based forecasts is shown in the corresponding final column. In the fourth row, we
examine the correlation coefficient. One might be concerned that the better performance
of the expectation‐based forecasts reflects the fact that they rely on an estimated
parameter,
value of

, and thus they use up one more degree of freedom. That is, our estimated
“tilts” the expectations data so that the implied forecasts lie along the 45‐

degree line. The correlation coefficient effectively both tilts the data and shifts it up and
down, so as to maximize fit. Thus, it arguably puts each forecast on something closer to
an equal footing. Even so, the expectation‐based forecasts are also more highly
correlated with actual vote shares than are the intention‐based forecasts.
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Table 3: Comparing the Accuracy of Naïve Forecasts of Vote Shares
Raw
Voter
Intention:

Transformed
Voter
Expectation:
.

Test of
Equality

.

Root Mean Squared Error

0.151
(0.008)

0.089
(0.005)

t344=7.05
(p<0.0001)

Mean Absolute Error

0.115
(0.006)

0.067
(0.003)

t344=8.81
(p<0.0001)

How often is forecast closer?

35.0%
(2.7)

65.0%
(2.7)

t344=5.37

Correlation

0.571

0.757

Encompassing regression:

0.058**
(0.026)

0.480***
(0.035)

Optimal weights:

8.5%**
(3.7)

91.5%***
(3.7)

(p<0.0001)

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
Democrat’s share of the two‐party vote in n=311 elections. Comparisons in the third column test
the equality of the measures in the first two columns. In the encompassing regression, the
constant
0.207∗∗∗ (se=0.013).

We also show a Fair‐Shiller (1989 and 1990) regression, attempting to predict
election outcomes on the basis of a constant, and our two alternative forecasts. The
expectation‐based forecast has a large and extremely statistically significant weight, as
does the constant. But it does not fully encompass the information in the intention‐
based forecast, which still receives a statistically significant, albeit small weight. Finally,
we estimate the optimal weighted average of these two forecasts, which puts greater
than 90% of the weight on the expectation‐based forecast.
These tests, of course, are all based on the common but problematic assumption
that our sample data can be interpreted as representing population moments. We now
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turn to generating statistically efficient forecasts instead, and will repeat our forecast
evaluation exercise based on these adjusted forecasts.

IV.

Efficient Poll‐Based Forecasts of Vote Share
An important insight common to both Figure 1 and Figure 3 is that in those

elections where the Democrats are favored, the final outcome typically does favor
Democrats, but by less than suggested by the naïve forecasts based on either voter
intentions or voter expectations. Likewise, when the poll favors Republicans, the
Democrats do tend to lose, but again, by less than suggested by our naïve forecasts. In
fact, this is a natural implication of sampling error, because our extreme polls likely
reflect sampling variation, and so it is unsurprising that they are not matched by
extreme outcomes. It is this observation that motivates our use of shrinkage estimators
in this section—“shrinking” the raw estimates of the proportion intending to vote for
one candidate or another toward a closer race. This idea is widely understood by
political scientists (Campbell, 2000), but is typically ignored in media commentary. We
will also adjust for any biases (or “house effects”) in these data.
In the following discussion it is important to distinguish between the actual vote
share won by the Democrat,
candidate,

, from the sample proportion who intend to vote for the

, and the optimal intention‐based forecast,

|

. Likewise, we

distinguish the sample proportion who expect a candidate to win,
population proportion,
|

, from the

, and our optimal expectation‐based forecast of the vote share,

. Because we are only analyzing respondents with valid expectation and intent

data, each forecast will be based on the same sample size,

.

We will begin by analyzing forecasts based on standard polls of voter intentions,
and will then turn to analyzing how voter expectations might improve these forecasts.
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Interpreting Voter Intentions
Our goal is to find the mapping between our raw voter intentions data, and the
forecast which minimizes the mean squared forecast error. The usual approach—of
fitting an OLS regression line—involves shrinking each estimate back toward the grand
mean, using the signal‐to‐noise ratio. (This is why the least‐squares estimator of an
errors‐in‐variables model yields a regression coefficient that is shrunk by a factor related
to the signal‐to‐noise ratio in the explanatory variable.) The difficulty is that in our
setting, the sample size varies widely across each race, and as Figure 4 illustrates, so too
does the noise underpinning each observation.

Forecast Error: Vr - Vr(hat)
Actual Democratic Vote Share LESS Intentions Poll

Figure 4: Sample Size and Forecast Errors in the Intent Poll
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Our point of departure in this section is to note that our sample estimate of the
proportion of voters intending to vote for a candidate is a noisy estimate—and possibly
also biased—estimate of the election outcome:
, where
Where and
and

~

0,

[7]

is a bias term which picks up the pro‐Democrat house effect in ANES polls,

is the noise term.32 In particular, notice the subscript on the variance of this

noise term, which reflects the fact that sampling variability will vary with the
characteristics (particularly, sample size) of a specific poll. Assuming that

0

we get the following familiar result:
[8]

|

where

and

are the mean and variance of the Democratic vote share, across all the

races in our dataset. Forming an optimal intentions‐based forecast requires estimating
each of these parameters. We estimate the average vote share of Democrats directly
∑

from our sample:
∑

vote share is:
term,

∑

0.468

⁄

0.005 , and the variance of the Democrat
0.0089. Likewise, it is easy to estimate the bias

0.031

0.008 . (This bias in the ANES is reasonably large,

statistically significant, and to our reading, has not previously been documented; even
when we cluster results by year, the bias remains statistically significant.) All that
remains is to sort out the variance of the polls, which can be broken into:
where

,

.33

We also tested for an anti‐incumbent party bias, but found it to be small and statistically
insignificant.
33 Any variance in the bias term from cycle to cycle would be included in the variance of the
polling error.
32
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There are two sources of error to consider. First, these polls are typically taken
one month prior to the election,34 and many voters may change their minds in the final
weeks of the campaign. Hence while we are sampling from a population where
percent of respondents will ultimately vote for the Democrat, but when they are polled
one month prior, an extra

percent intend to vote Democratic. Second, sampling error

plays an important role, particularly in small samples. Assuming that these two sources
0, the variance of the polling

of error are orthogonal so that
error can be decomposed as:

[9]
where the first term in the above expression reflects the variability in “true” public
opinion between polling day and Election Day (and hence is unrelated to the size of our
samples). Our data does not have any useful time variation, and so we simply use the
estimate of

0.001, from Lock and Gelman (2010) (who estimate this as a function of

time before the election; we use their fitted value for one‐month before Election Day).
The second term reflects sampling variability, and because the poll result
of a binomial variable with mean

is the mean

, this second term can be expressed as:
1

0.25
[10]

The numerator of this expression is the product of the vote shares of the two
parties, if the election were held on polling day. For most elections (and particularly
competitive contests), the term

1

0.25, and so we use this

approximation. (We obtain similar results when we plug in actual vote shares or vote
shares from the previous election instead; our approximation has the virtue of being
usable in a real‐time forecasting context.) The denominator,

denotes the effective

sample size of the specific poll in race . If the sample were a simple random sample,
34

In fact, the polls are taken fairly uniformly over the two months prior to the election.
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the effective sample size would be exactly equal to the actual sample size. But the
American National Election Studies uses a complex sample design, polling only in a
limited number of primary sampling units. The “design effect”

corrects for the effects

of the intra‐cluster correlation within these sampling units. (The subscript

serves as a

reminder that it varies with the sample size of specific poll—for instance, it is one when
1—and the superscript

serves as a reminder that the design effect varies, and this

is the design effect for voter intentions). Unfortunately published estimates of

are

based on design effects in national samples, and so they cannot be applied to our
analysis of state samples. Moreover, the public release files in the ANES files do not
contain sufficient detail about the sampling scheme to allow us to estimate these design
effects directly. A standard approach to estimating
factor”,

1

1 , where

is by the so‐called “Moulton

is the intra‐cluster correlation coefficient (Moulton,

1990).35 In what follows, we assume that

is constant across states and time. While we

lack the details on sampling clusters to estimate

directly, we can estimate it indirectly.

Figure 4 highlights the underlying variation, showing a consistent pattern of errors varying with
the sample size of a poll. Our identification comes from the fact that this pattern is shaped by
declines with sample size.

—the higher is , the less quickly the variance of
Thus, we return to equation [8], plug in the values for

,

,

and

and estimate

directly by running non‐linear least‐squares on the following regression:
[11]
1

4

1

which yielded an estimate of

0.030 (with a standard error of 0.0080), which implies

an average design effect of

2.09. Thus, returning to equation [8], our MSE‐

minimizing forecast based on the voter intentions data, is:

A remaining difficulty is that while we assume that the total observations for each state come
from a single cluster, in fact some of the larger states include multiple primary sampling units.
Thus, our approach is appropriate if we think of as the intra‐cluster correlation, where a
“cluster” is the set of sampled addresses within a state.

35
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|
0.468
0.0089

0.0089
1
0.0001

4

1 0.030

0.031

0.468

Given the data in our sample, the shrinkage estimator (the coefficient on the de‐
meaned and de‐biased intent poll) averages 0.33 (which corresponds closely with the
average slope seen in Figure1, but it ranges from 0.03 (in a race with only one survey
respondent) to 0.47.

Figure 5: Efficient Intention‐Based Forecasts and Actual Vote Share
1.0 Root Mean Square Error = 0.076

Mean Absolute Error = 0.056

Actual Democratic Vote Share: Vr
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In Figure 5, we show the relationship between our optimal intention‐based
forecast and actual vote share. These adjusted intention‐based forecasts are clearly more
accurate than the naïve forecasts numbers: the forecasts lie along the 45‐degree line, and
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both the mean absolute error and the root mean squared error are about half that found
Figure 1. We now turn to finding the most efficient transformation of our voter
expectation data.
Interpreting Voter Expectations
In our previous analysis in Section III, we transformed data on voter expectations
|

into vote share forecasts based on
means that we are trying to figure out
|

estimating the

. But taking the sample variability seriously
|

. As an intermediate step, we begin by

. Once again, we turn to a shrinkage estimator in order to

generate efficient estimates of

, given our small sample estimates,

. As in equation

[8],
[12]

|

where

is the mean across all elections of the proportion of the population who expect

the Democrat to win;

of the corresponding variance, while

is the variance of the

corresponding sample estimator; and as before, we have a bias parameter,

which

allows for the possibility that these data oversample people who expect Democrats to
win.
The key difficulty in working with data on voter expectations rather than voter
intentions is that while we do ultimately observe how the entire population votes, we
never observe what the whole population expects. Thus in estimating population
parameters, we will rely heavily on the mapping in equation [5] between population
vote shares and population expectations.36 Using this insight, we estimate
∑Φ
∑

.

Φ

⁄

0.427
.

⁄

0.005 . Likewise we estimate the bias term
0.043

0.009 . This bias term represents the increased

We are yet to adjust our standard errors for the extra uncertainty generated because we are
using an estimate of .
36
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probability of an individual expects a Democrat to win, its importance cannot be directly
compared to the intention data, where the bias has a meaningful impact in the naïve
intention‐based forecast of vote share.
The numerator of the shrinkage estimator in equation [12] is the variance of the
population expectation across all elections, and it is also quite straightforward to
∑

estimate:

0.0450. All that remains is to sort out the denominator

of the shrinkage estimator,

, which is equal to the underlying variation in population

expectations across elections, plus sampling variability. Because different elections have
different sample sizes, this denominator varies across elections. Again, because we are
asking about binary outcome—whether or not you expect the Democrat to win in your
state—we know the functional form of the relevant sampling error. Thus:
0.25

1

[13]

where, the approximation follows because the product of the population proportions
expecting each candidate,
Φ

.

Φ

.

1

Φ

.

Φ

.

, and in turn,

0.25 because most elections are competitive (and

small).37 As before,

is the effective sample size, and

is the relevant design effect,

1

and we apply the “Moulton factor” to estimate

is not too

1

. The

superscript

on the intra‐cluster correlation reminds us that there is no reason to expect the intra‐
cluster correlation in voter expectations to be similar to that for voter intentions. Thus,
our remaining challenge is to estimate the intra‐class correlation in voter expectations.
As we did with the voter intentions data, we will use an indirect approach to estimating
Notice that equation [13] involves the product of the population proportions who expect each
candidate to win, and it is this product that ≈0.25. As previously noted, we don’t actually observe
these population proportions, but we do observe the population vote shares, and using the
37

transformation in equation [5], we confirm that Φ
samples,

1

.

1

Φ

.

0.25. In our small

can diverge quite significantly from 0.25.

55

. That is, we plug the results in equations [12] and [13] back in to equation [6] to get a
simple vote share forecasting equation, and find the value that yields the best overall fit:
[14]
|

0.5

Φ

1

4

1

We fit this equation using non‐linear least squares, and it yields an estimate of
0.045 se

0.010 , which in turn implies an average design effect

2.62, and

that the shrinkage estimator which has an average value of 0.65, ranges from 0.14 to 0.76.
Thus, our MSE‐minimizing forecast of the Democrats vote share, based only the voter
expectations data is:

|

0.5

0.150Φ

0.040

0.440
0.040

1

4

1 0.045

0.043

0.427

In Figure 6, we show the relationship between our efficient expectation‐based
forecast and actual election outcomes. These adjusted expectation‐based forecasts are
clearly very accurate, and appropriately scaled: the forecasts lie along the 45‐degree line.
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Figure 6: Efficient Expectation‐Based Forecast and Election Outcomes
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Forecast evaluation
Turning to Table 4, we see that these efficient forecasts based on voter
expectations are more accurate than efficient intention‐based forecasts. Again, the first
two rows show that the expectation‐based forecasts yield both a root mean squared
error and mean absolute error that is less than the intention‐based forecasts by a
statically significant amount. The third row shows that the expectation‐based forecasts
are also the more accurate forecast in 63% of these elections, very similar to the naïve
approach. The expectation‐based forecasts are still more highly correlated with actual
vote shares than are the intention‐based forecasts by a sizable margin. In the Fair‐Shiller
regression, the expectation‐based forecasts have a much larger weight than the
intention‐based forecast; both are statistically significant, so the intention‐based data is
providing some unique information. Finally, an optimally weighted average still puts
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just over 90% of the weight on the expectation‐based forecast. While that number may
not seem remarkable in the context of this paper, it is remarkable in the context of
society. If you take step back from this paper, consider that the average weight placed
on expectation polls by pollsters, the press, and campaigns is 0%, as it is generally
ignored.

Table 4: Comparing the Accuracy of Efficient Forecasts of Vote Share
Efficient
Voter
Intention:

Efficient
Voter
Expectation:

|

Test of
Equality

|

Root Mean Squared Error

0.076
(0.005)

0.060
(0.006)

t310=5.75
(p<0.0001)

Mean Absolute Error

0.056
(0.003)

0.042
(0.002)

t310=6.09
(p<0.0001)

How often is forecast closer?

37.0%
(2.6)

63.0%
(2.6)

t310=4.75
(p<0.0001)

Correlation

0.593

0.768

0.184**
(0.089)

0.913***
(0.067)

9.5%
(6.7)

90.5%***
(6.7)

Encompassing regression:
Optimal weights:

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
Democrat’s share of the two‐party vote in n=311 elections. Comparisons in the third column test
the equality of the measures in the first two columns. In the encompassing regression, the
constant
0.046 (se=0.030).

V.

Efficient Poll‐Based Probabilistic Forecasts
So far we have introduced two different outcome variables: the prediction of the

winner and the level of the outcome, but frequently the most desirable outcome metric
for stakeholders of an event is the probabilistic forecast. In this section we translate our
raw polling data, from both voter intention and expectation, into efficient poll‐based
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probabilistic forecasts. We start with our forecast of the vote shares generated from both
types of data:

|

for intention data and

|

for expectation data. The

probability that the Democrat wins the race is the probability that the actual vote share is
greater than 50%.38 We assume that the errors of our expectations are normally
distributed and the probability of victory for the Democratic candidate becomes:
0.5

Φ

0.5

[15]

,

To create probabilistic forecasts, we are going to need to determine the variance
of the error. Figure 7 revisits Figure 4, but instead of showing the errors from the raw
intention poll, it shows the errors from the efficient intention and expectation‐based
forecasts. The figure illustrates that there is still noise and that it varies with sample
size.

This is not true in many types of elections, but it is true in almost all Electoral College races in
our dataset.

38
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Forecast Error: Vr - E[Vr]
Actual Democratic Vote Share LESS Forecast of Vote Share

Figure 7: Sample Size and Forecast Errors in the Forecasts of Vote Share
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To determine the variance of the error, we start with the standard error of a
forecast:

√

1

(Barreto and Howland, 2006). We use equation [11],
and we think of the

, where

as the raw data

is the average raw data. Thus, the variance of the forecasts:

,

[16]

The root mean square error (squared) is of the two equations we use to
determine the shrinkage estimate; equation [11] for intention and equation [14] for
expectation. It captures the accuracy of the equation in estimating the within sample
data used to calibrate the forecast model. The other part of the variance is the standard
deviation of the shrinkage estimator (squared) interacted with the distance between the
raw data and the mean data. The intuition behind this is that we should assume less
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accurate forecasts, the less accurate the estimation of the coefficient we use to transform
our raw data is and how unusual the raw data is compared to the average raw data. For
the expectation data, we use the “naïve” forecast of vote share as the raw data. This
term is going to pick up the noise correlated with sample size, as low sample sizes have
more polls that post very far from the average poll.
The RMSE for intention is 0.076 and expectation 0.060; as we know from Section
IV, the forecasts of vote share from the expectation data is more accurate.
is 0.177 for intention and 0.186 for expectation. On average, about half of the
,

comes from the each side of the equation and the estimated standard deviation

does decrease with sample size. Putting together equation [15] and [16]:
[17]
0.5

Φ

0.5

In Table 5 we show that probabilistic forecasts based on the expectation data are
more accurate than those based on the intention data. The first row shows that the
expectation‐based probabilities yield a smaller root mean squared error than the
intention‐based probabilities by a statically significant amount. The second row shows
that the expectation‐based probabilities are also the more accurate forecast in 80% of
these elections, a statistically significant difference. In the Fair‐Shiller regression, the
expectation‐based probabilities have a much larger weight than the intention‐based
forecast; the intention‐based data is not statistically significant, so we cannot discount
the possibility that the intention‐based probability is providing no unique information.
Finally, an optimally weighted average puts most of the weight on the expectation‐
based probability.
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Table 5: Comparing the Accuracy of Efficient Probabilistic Forecasts
Efficient
Voter
Intention:

Efficient
Voter
Expectation:

. |

. |

Root Mean Squared Error

0.442
(0.007)

0.345
(0.012)

t344=10.4
(p<0.0001)

How often is forecast closer?

20.0%
(2.3)

80.0%
(2.3)

t344=13.2
(p<0.0001)

0.216
(0.155)

1.776***
(0.201)

‐0.784***

1.784***

(0.185)

(0.185)

Encompassing regression:

Optimal weights:

Test of
Equality

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
Democrat’s probability of victory in n=311 elections. Comparisons in the third column test the
equality of the measures in the first two columns. In the encompassing regression, the constant
0.035 (se=0.114).

VI.

Efficient Poll‐Based Forecasts of 2008
We now test how the coefficients, developed with data from 1952‐2004, forecast

the 2008 Electoral College races. Since this is an “out‐of‐sample” comparison, the
forecast of vote share use the coefficients derived in Section IV and the probabilistic
forecast use the coefficients derived in Section V. In Table 2 we show that 2008 is just
one of two years in which the expectation poll is not more correct in predicting the
winner of the races than the intention poll; they were tied in 2008. Yet, Table 6 shows
that the expectation question provides a much more accurate and informative forecast of
2008 than the intention question. The expectation‐based forecasts have smaller errors
and higher correlation in all of the forecast for vote share and probability of victory
comparisons, and carry more weight in all of the joint estimations for forecast of vote
share and partially in probability of victory. Since the expectation‐based forecasts are
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statistically significant in encompassing regression and the intention‐based forecast is
not, we cannot rule out that intention data provides no useful information beyond
expectation data in 2008.

Table 6: Comparing the Accuracy of Efficient Forecasts for the 2008 Electoral
College

Forecast of Vote Share:

Efficient
Voter
Intention:
|

Efficient
Voter
Expectation:
|

0.093

0.085

(0.021)

(0.022)

0.063

0.056

(0.012)

(0.011)

47.1%

52.9%

(8.7)

(8.7)

Correlation

61.6%

69.2%

Encompassing regression:

0.330

0.684***

(0.291)

(0.250)

24.7%

75.3%***

(26.7)

(26.7)

Root Mean Squared Error

Mean Absolute Error

How often is forecast closer?

Optimal weights:

Probabilistic Forecasts:
Root Mean Squared Error

How often is forecast closer?
Encompassing regression:

Optimal weights:

. |

Test of
Equality
t33=1.28
(p<0.2105)
t33=0.92
(p<0.3656)
t33=0.34
(p<0.7371)

. |

0.458

0.403

(0.022)

(0.048)

23.5%

76.5%

(7.4)

(7.4)

1.618

1.224**

(1.289)

(0.520)

2.4%

97.6%**

(39.1)

(39.1)

t344=1.55
(p<0.1295)
t344=3.58
(p<0.0011)

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
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Democrat’s forecast of voter share and probability of victory in n=34 elections (the 34 Electoral
College races chosen by the ANES). Comparisons in the third column test the equality of the
measures in the first two columns. In the encompassing regression, the constant
0.032
(se=0.097) for vote share and
1.242 (se=0.504) for probability of victory.

VII.

Efficient Poll‐Based Forecasts from Non‐Random Samples
Under many circumstances we are left making forecasts based off polls with

overtly non‐random samples. An extreme example of that would be a poll where all of
the respondents support just one of the candidates. In this section we test the accuracy
of forecasts based off of the expectation question data originating from respondents who
are exclusively voting for one major party or the other, by comparing those forecasts to
forecasts created from the full sample of intentions. For the non‐random samples, the
sample size drops from an average of 38 to about 19 respondents.
We start by revisiting equation [12] from Section IV:
, where

|

is the mean across all elections of the proportion of the population who

expect the Democrat to win and

is the corresponding variance. These values are the

same in this biased sample as they are in Section IV.39

is the variance of the sample

estimator, and our bias parameter, , will attempt to account for the oversample people
who expect Democrats to win (which should be heavily positive in a Democratic only
sample and heavily negative in a Republican only sample).
The bias term is

∑

Φ

.

⁄ . This is 0.203 (0.016) for the

Democratic sample and ‐0.112 (0.012) for the Republican sample. In Section IV, we
conclude that the full dataset has a bias of 0.042, approximately half the difference in the
absolute bias of the Democratic and Republican supporters.

There is a slight variation in the variables because 5 of the races in our dataset have no
Democratic supporters and 4 no Republican supporters. Thus, when we drop those races from
the dataset when we explore forecast accuracy of the respective non‐random samples.
39
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We make the same assumptions as in Section IV in regard to
combining equations [13] and [14], is

, which,

. We are going to have to re‐

derive  for these two biased samples, as the clustering is going to have a totally
different affect within party. Both samples have the same

and about half the

observations as the full samples. This yields shrinkage estimators (i.e.,

) for the

Democratic sample with an average of 0.59, ranges from 0.14 to 0.74. Not surprisingly,
the full dataset has shrinkage estimators that are on average 7.5 percentage points larger,
ranging from a low of the same to a higher of 54 percentage points larger. For the
Republican sample, the differences are not as stark, with the Republican sample having
slightly smaller

than the full sample; the full sample has shrinkage estimators that are

on average 2.5 percentage points larger, but they range from a low of ‐7 percentage
points smaller to 42 percentage points larger.
In Table 7 we show that forecasts based on the expectations of the Democratic
voters only or the Republican voters only, a non‐random selection of approximately half
of the sample, yield a lower root mean squared error, mean absolute error, and higher
correlation than forecasts based on the full sample of voter intention. The first two rows
show that the expectation‐based forecasts yield both a root mean squared error and
mean absolute error that is less than the intention‐based forecasts by a statically
significant amount for the Republican sample and a weakly significant amount for the
Democratic sample. The third row shows that the expectation‐based forecasts are also
the more accurate forecast in the majority of elections. The expectation‐based forecasts
are still more highly correlated with actual vote shares than are the intention‐based
forecasts by a sizable margin. In the Fair‐Shiller regression, the expectation‐based
forecasts have a much larger weight than the intention‐based forecast; both are
statistically significant, so the intention‐based data may be providing some unique
information. Finally, an optimally weighted average still puts nearly 60% of the weight
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on the expectation‐based forecast in the Democratic sample and just over 70% in the
Republican sample.

Table 7: Comparing the Accuracy of Efficient Forecasts of Vote Shares from
Biased Samples
Democratic Sample

Forecast of Vote Share:

Intention:
|
Full
Sample

Republican Sample

Expectation: Intention:
|
|
Democratic
Full
Supporters
Sample

Expectation:
|
Republican
Supporters

Root Mean Squared Error

0.075
(0.005)

0.070
(0.006)

0.071
(0.004)

0.062
(0.004)

Mean Absolute Error

0.056
(0.003)

0.050
(0.003)

0.054
(0.003)

0.048
(0.002)

How often is forecast closer?

46.7%
(2.9)

53.3%
(2.9)

44.0%
(2.8)

56.0%
(2.8)

Correlation

0.592

0.664

0.604

0.718

0.625***
(0.078)

0.790***
(0.071)

0.489***
(0.077)

0.786***
(0.065)

38.5%***
(6.6)

61.5%***
(6.6)

29.8%***
(6.3)

70.2%***
(6.3)

Encompassing regression:

Optimal weights:

306 Elections

307 Elections

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
Democrat’s share of the two‐party vote. In the encompassing regression with the Democratic
sample, the constant
0.196 (se=0.036)*** and in the Republican sample, the constant
0.129 (se=0.031)***. A few of the 311 observations are dropped in each sample, because there is
no intention for the given party.

In Table 8 we show that probabilistic forecasts based on the expectation data are
more accurate than those based on the intention data. The first row shows that the
expectation‐based probabilities yield a smaller root mean squared error than the
intention‐based probabilities by a statically significant amount. The second row shows
that the expectation‐based probabilities are also the more accurate in slightly more
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elections. In the Fair‐Shiller regression, the expectation‐based probabilities have a
much larger weight than the intention‐based forecast; both are statistically significant,
so the intention‐based data may be providing some unique information. Finally, an
optimally weighted average still puts most of the weight on the expectation‐based
forecast.

Table 8: Comparing the Accuracy of Efficient Probabilistic Forecasts
Democratic Sample

Republican Sample

Voter
Intention:

Voter
Expectation:

Voter
Intention:

Voter
Expectation:

Root Mean Squared Error

0.444
(0.006)

0.388
(0.010)

0.442
(0.006)

0.357
(0.013)

How often is forecast closer?

28.4%
(2.6)

71.5%
(2.6)

19.9%
(2.3)

80.1%
(2.3)

1.73***
(0.40)

1.62***
(0.20)

1.29***
(0.41)

1.53***
(0.17)

‐0.336**

1.336***

‐0.435***

1.435***

(0.170)

(0.170)

(0.152)

(0.152)

Probabilistic Forecasts:

Encompassing regression:

Optimal weights:

306 Elections

307 Elections

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). These are assessments of forecasts of the
Democrat’s probability of victory. In the encompassing regression with the Democratic sample,
the constant
0.009 (se=0.093). In the encompassing regression with the Republican sample,
the constant
0.235(se=0.103). A few of the 311 observations are dropped in each sample,
because there is no intention for the given party.

VIII.

Efficient Poll‐Based Forecasts from Secondary Dataset
Our secondary dataset consists of any poll from around the world that we could

find that asks both an intent and expectation question. The polls are a hodgepodge of
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USA and non‐USA elections, executive and legislative offices, and the full range of
national elections to smaller districts.
Table 9 summarizes the forecast performance of our two questions in forecasting
the winning candidate, mimicking the input in Table 2. Again, we use a very coarse
performance metric, simply scoring the proportion of races in which the candidate who
won a majority in the relevant poll ultimately won the election. The expectation question
is correct more often than the intent question in both 0 to 90 and 90 to 180 days before
the election; this difference is statistically significant. Indeed this difference is largest in
the 90 to 180 day segment. For reasons we are not quite sure of, the expectation question
is essentially random after 180 days, in the data in our dataset, but many of those polls
are actually a full year and beyond before the election.

Table 9: Comparing the Accuracy from Secondary Dataset
Days Before the Election ≤ 90 90 < Days Before the Election ≤ 180 Days Before the Election > 180
Proportion of observations where the winning candidate was correctly predicted by a majority of respondents to:
Expect Intent # Obs # Elections Expect Intent # Obs # Elections Expect Intent # Obs # Elections
President
89.4% 80.7% 161
19
69.2% 61.5% 39
12
59.6% 57.7% 52
11
1936 Electoral
72.3% 80.9% 47
47
‐
‐
0
0
‐
‐
0
0
College
Governor
78.9% 78.9% 19
9
83.3% 50.0%
6
6
100.0% 100.0% 2
1
Senator
81.8% 90.9% 11
7
‐
‐
0
0
‐
‐
0
0
Mayor
100.0% 100.0% 4
2
100.0% 66.7%
3
1
‐
‐
0
0
Other
80.0% 80.0% 10
9
100.0% 66.7%
3
2
50.0% 50.0%
2
2
USA Total
84.9% 81.3% 252
93
74.5% 60.8% 51
21
60.7% 58.9% 56
14
AUS (Parliament) 88.9% 41.7% 36
3
66.7% 33.3% 21
3
24.4% 66.3% 86
2
9
100.0% 92.3% 13
7
69.4% 62.9% 62
9
GBR (Parliament) 85.0% 90.0% 20
FRA (President)
60.9% 56.5% 23
4
40.0% 20.0%
5
3
‐
‐
0
0
Other
71.4% 71.4%
7
6
0.0% 0.0%
1
1
0.0% 0.0%
1
1
non‐USA Total
79.1% 59.3% 86
22
72.5% 50.0% 40
14
43.0% 64.4% 149
12
Total
83.4% 75.7% 338
115
73.6% 56.0% 91
35
47.8% 62.9% 205
26
Diff (standard error) 7.7%* (2.2)
17.7%* (4.8)
‐15.1%* (4.4)

IX.

A Structural Interpretation
At this point, it’s worth reflecting on just why it is that the expectation‐based

forecasts are more accurate. The basic intuition is simply that each of us possesses
substantial information that is relevant to forecasting the election outcome, but the voter
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intention question only elicits part of this information set. By asking about each
respondent’s expectation, a poll can effectively aggregate this broader information set.
We can formalize this idea with a very simple model that also does surprisingly
well at matching the key facts about voter expectations. We conceptualize a survey
respondent’s expectation as deriving from her knowledge of her own voting intention,
as well as those of
survey of

1 of her friends, family, and coworkers, effectively creating a

likely voters. We denote the proportion of person ’s sample who plan to

vote for the Democrat as
an unbiased sample, then

. If each person’s individual “informal poll” is drawn from
is a random variable with mean

and variance of

1

/ . Using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution, this suggests that
the probability an individual respondent expects the Democrat to win is:

0.5

[18]

0.5

Φ

Φ 2√

1

0.5

where Φ . is the standard normal cdf. The approximation equality follows because in
competitive elections 1/

1

2.

Thus, equation [15] suggests that in a simple probit regression of whether an
individual forecasts the Democrat to win, the coefficient on the winning (or negative
losing) margin of the Democrat candidate reveals √ .40 The intuition here can be
explained by thinking about two extreme cases. If each survey respondent based their
expectations on an informal poll of thousands of friends, then even in very close races,
most of them will agree on which candidate they expect to win. But if each respondent
polls only a couple of friends, then sampling variation will have a larger influence, and
there will be much greater disagreement over the likely winner. Thus, the basic logic

We can avoid the approximation noted above, and run a probit regression where the
.
dependent variable is instead
; this yields similar results.

40
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identifying our estimate of

can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the likelihood that

the expectations of survey respondents are consistent with each other, as a function of
how close the race is.
In fact, we have already run the regression described in equation [18]—it is
identical to that described in equation [4], which we used to estimate
these equations we see that 2√
0.150, we infer that

, or

. Comparing

. Thus given our estimate of

11 (the exact coefficient is 11.11, and the standard error

clustering by state‐year and applying the delta method is 1.12). That is, our simple
model suggests that each poll respondent bases her expectation on a poll of herself, plus
10 friends.
We should add a qualifier to this interpretation which highlights that this simple
model also serves as a metaphor for a slightly more realistic scenario. In particular, it is
likely that the social network of any survey respondent is not a representative random
sample. It may be that their social networks contain a known partisan bias or that
specific clusters of friends have correlated voting intentions. Our point is simply that
the voter expectation question draws upon a broader information set, whose forecasting
value is similar to that of an unbiased or random sample with an effective sample size of
eleven.
Table 10 shows the relationship between intention, the winning candidate, and
expectation in the primary dataset. In approximately half of our individual‐level
observations (48.8%), the respondent has the same expectation and intention and that
candidate wins the elections. In less than 10% of individual‐level observations (9.2%)
the respondent does not expect the candidate for whom she intends to vote to win, but
the candidate does win. In the remaining 42% of observations, where the voter intention
is not for the winning candidate, the respondents expect the winner 19.7% and expect
the candidate they intend 22.3%. Another way to look at the data is that in 71.1% of
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observations the respondent expecting their intended candidate to win: 48.8% correctly
and 22.3% incorrectly. And 28.9% of observations the respondent expects their intended
candidate to lose: 19.7% correctly and 9.2% incorrectly.

Table 10: Relationship between Voter Intention, the Winner, and Expectation
Intention

Winner

Expectation

Democratic

Democratic

Democratic

Percent of
Respondents

1

1

1

19.0%

1

0

1

15.8%

1

1

0

3.4%

1

0

0

12.3%

0

1

1

7.5%

0

0

1

5.8%

0

1

0

6.5%

0

0

0

29.8%

Notes: There are n=13,208 individual‐level observations, including 2008 data.

Figure 8 charts the proportion of respondents that expect the Democratic
candidate to win for any given actual vote share. We do so for both the full data set of
13,208 individual responses and the structural interpretation from above. From
equation [18], if a random respondent has a probability of Φ 2√11

0.5

of

expecting the Democratic candidate to win, a Democratic supporter has a Φ 2√10
0.45

probability of expecting the Democratic candidate to win. One of the eleven

votes is guaranteed to the Democrats, so that only 5 of the remaining 10 votes need to go
Democratic for the respondent to expect the Democratic candidate to win. Likewise, a
Republican supporter expects the Democratic candidate to win with a probability of
Φ 2√10

0.55 .

Table 10 and Figure 8 confirm that there is a mix of information reaching the
respondents about the election. As in Figure 2, Figure 8 shows a positive correlation
71

between vote share and expecting to win, for both types of intended voters. If the
respondents only considered their own intention, they would expect their own intended
candidate 100%, but only do so 71.1% (Table 10) and there would be a straight line of
circles at 0 for the Republicans and 100 for the Democrats (Figure 8). If the respondents
only considered an unbiased signal, respondents of different intentions would be
equally likely to expect the other candidate, at a given vote share. Figure 8 illustrates
that respondents are much more likely to expect a candidate to win, at any given vote
share, if they intend to vote for that candidate. We know that there is a noisy signal;
9.2% of respondents switch their expectation away from their intended candidate to the
losing candidate (Table 10). Further, the noisy signal cannot be too biased towards the
voter’s intention, because if all signals were completely biased towards their intention
then there would be no explanation for a respondent to expect a losing candidate to win,
despite a preference for that candidate. Finally, the figure shows that our simple
structural interpretation is a reasonable fit for the actual data.
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Figure 8: Relationship between Intention, Expectation, and Actual Vote Share

Prop ortion E x pecting D em oc rat to W in

Proportion expecting the Democrat to win
among Democrat and Republican voters
Intend to vote Democrat

Intend to vote Republican

Model inference for Democrats

Model inference for Republicans

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.3

0.4

0.5
Actual Democrat Vote Share

0.6

0.7

Local linear regression estimates, using Epanechnikov kernal and rule-of-thumb bandwidth.
Shaded area shows 95% confidence interval.

X.

Discussion
A Fox News poll, in the field on September 8 and 9 of 2008, prompted a headline

trumpeting McCain’s lead in the intent question, but buried Obama’s continued lead in
the expectation question.41 This is an editorial choice that almost any polling or news
organization would have made. Yet, while McCain and Obama occasionally traded the
lead in the intent question, Obama, the eventual winner, led in every expectation
question we could find. We hope that this paper will give editors, as well as pollsters,
campaigns, and researchers, pause in future elections, as we have proved the
expectation question significantly useful in creating accurate forecasts of all major
outcome variables.
41

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,420361,00.html
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The structural interpretation of the response to the expectation question helps
illustrate why expectations are such a powerful polling tool. The answer we receive
from the expectation question includes all of the information in the intention question as
well as the intention of approximately ten friends, family, and coworkers who are likely
voters. This multiplication of the sample size is crucial in making the expectation
question remarkably valuable with small sample sizes. That phenomenon, combined
with the identification of likely voters, is what enables expectation polls to provide
valuable information, even with a non‐random sample of respondents.
The structural interpretation offers clues into the ratio of the sources of data that
people are using in creating expectations of elections and this can be applied to a wide
set of disciplines. One example is questions about economic voting. There is very
important question about whether people vote (or frame their political preferences in
general) on their own pocketbook (egotropic) or the national economy (sociotropic). We
have a tool to look at which source of information is framing their expectations, where
their expectations are the main input in their preferences or revealed utility. The same
example can be done for the popularity of a new style of jeans in marketing or for
consumer sentiment on durable goods in coming months in economics. In any situation
where individual‐level stakeholders are exposed to private information and public
signals the results and methods of this paper illustrate meaningful information that can
be extracted by individual‐level questions of expectations.
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Expectations: Point‐Estimates, Probability Distributions,
Confidence, and Forecasts
Abstract
In this article I test a new interactive web‐based interface that captures both “best
estimate” point‐estimates and probability distributions from non‐experts. As in the
previous literature, respondents are overconfident. My innovation is to show that in
contrast to standard methods of directly asking respondents to state their confidence,
using my method, which induces the respondents to reveal confidence, there is a sizable
and statically significant positive relationship between confidence and the accuracy of
individual‐level expectations. This positive correlation between confidence and accuracy
can be utilized to create confidence‐weighted aggregated forecasts that are more
accurate than the standard “consensus forecasts.” The payment of financial incentives
does not affect these findings.

I. Introduction
The main method tested in this article captures “best‐estimate” point‐estimates
and then probability distributions from non‐experts on upcoming events. Utilizing a
graphical, interactive interface, only possible with web‐based polling, my method
provides several innovations to ease the creation of probability distributions by non‐
expert respondents. The point‐estimates and probability distributions are used to
explore both the nature of individual‐level expectations and forecasts, especially in
regard to the individual‐level confidence, as revealed through the size and shape of the
probability distribution.
The responses demonstrate a slight overconfidence. In testing confidence, I
compare my method of gathering probability distributions to the two most attractive
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alternatives: a simple four point scale of stated confidence and the best
calibrated/transparent method of asking for a confidence range around a point‐estimate.
Where comparable, the probability distributions and confidence range provide a similar
slight overconfidence; this overconfidence is consistent with the literature (Soll and
Klayman, 2004; Teigen and Jorgensen, 2005; and Speirs‐Bridge et al., 2010).42
There is a sizable and statistically significant correlation between confidence
from the probability distributions and the accuracy of the corresponding expectations
that has not been previously documented (where confidence is estimated as the inverse
of the variance). There is variation in the levels of confidence both within questions (i.e.,
between respondents) and within respondents (i.e., between questions), and this
correlation holds for both situation. This correlation is weaker and/or non‐significant in
the two simplified methods. Engleberg et al (2009) determines that the distribution of
probabilities widens as the event horizon lengthens. Yet, that article does not address
the correlation with the size of a distribution and the accuracy for a given event. Other
articles conclude that tighter confidences ranges correlate with increased overconfidence
(i.e., at best, confidence is uncorrelated with accuracy for non‐experts).43
Confidence can be used as a tool for weighing in the creation of aggregated
forecasts of the level of the outcome; these confidence‐weighted forecasts are more
accurate than forecasts from the point‐estimates alone. There is consensus that
aggregating expectations creates more accurate forecasts, on average, than picking
individual‐level expectations; Pennock and Reeves (2007) demonstrates that with a self‐
selected group of respondents making NFL predictions only 6 of the 2231 players are

Confidence is comparable in the percentage of answers that come to fruition within a
confidence range (a set of perfectly calibrated 80% confidence ranges would have 80% of the
answers occur within the range). Stated confidence cannot provide a measure and the confidence
range provides only the one range it was asked, where the probability distribution reveals an
infinite set of confidence ranges.
43 Kuklinski (2000) concludes that for objective political questions confidence can actually be
negatively correlated with accuracy.
42
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more accurate than the collective average. Further, there are numerous studies showing
that the simplest aggregation techniques are the most efficient (Bates and Granger, 1969;
Stock and Watson, 2004; Smith and Wallis, 2009). The simplest weight considered in
these articles, other than an average, is the inverse of the mean square error; this
occasionally provides a slightly smaller error than averages. The questions for this
article are answered concurrently by non‐experts, providing no opportunity for
historically derived weights; yet, if inverse of the variance of their probability
distributions is well calibrated, it could serve as a proxy for mean square error.44
This article addresses various literatures where Likert‐type rating scales are used
to supplement estimates. Phycology, political science, and marketing are just a few
literatures where there are standard survey practices that ask respondents to state their:
confidence, likelihood, or agreement with their previously stated estimations. Generally
these are ordered, one‐dimensional scales that are designed to provide an extra
dimension to the estimation. In Likert‐type rating scales, responding to varying
incentives, some respondents gravitate towards or away from extreme choices,
regardless of their true state, using a revealed method for confidence, respondents are
unaware of the extremities of reasonable answers or provided any reference if they wish
to manipulate the strength or weakness of their response. With Likert‐type rating scales
respondents see these questions as separate follow‐up questions, rather than the main
answer, providing different levels of attention and incentives, this article tests methods
of having the respondents reveal their confidence inside the main question. Finally, the
graphical nature of the method allows the researcher to subtly provide information that
allows respondents to answer more complicated questions revealing their confidence,
where the questions would be very difficult to ask in a telephone or in‐person setting.
Thus, the revealed confidence from my method is more representative of the

Thus, I do not have the data to attempt updating on risk profile as in Chen et al (2003) or more
complex Bayesian methods like those cataloged in Clemen (1989) or suggested in Clemen and
Winkler (1993).
44
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respondents’ information, rather than their natural state of confidence or a range
manipulated for any other incentive than the “best estimate” of the respondent.45
Prediction markets weigh their individual‐level data by how much money
people are willing to gamble, a proxy for confidence; this article illustrates the benefits of
a new method of directly weighing individual‐level polling data by confidence. There is
growing consensus that prediction markets aggregate individual‐level expectations into
more accurate forecasts than standard polling methods. Rothschild (2009) confirms the
accuracy of prediction market‐based forecasts and outlines some of the differences
between them and standard polls as methods of capturing and aggregating individual‐
level responses: the nature of their sample of respondents, the question asked to the
respondents, the aggregation method of the individual‐level data, and the incentives for
the respondents. Rothschild and Wolfers (2011) addresses the question being asked of
the respondents; that article concludes that eliciting expectations, as prediction markets
do, captures more information from the respondent than the questions asked in
standard polls. This article addresses another of the differences between prediction
markets and polls, the weighting of the individual‐level data.
In this article I test a graphical, interactive web‐based interface to advance the
ability of researchers to collect and utilize individual‐level expectations. I capture both
point‐estimates and probability distributions from non‐expert respondents. The results
provide insight into expectations, revealing the nature of their: accuracy, confidence,
and calibration of probabilities. Researchers can use these expectations as individual‐
level data for aggregated forecasts and, in the future, to understand heterogeneity in
revealed behavior under uncertainty. Better understanding of non‐expert expectations
Barber and Odean (2001) shows that men are more overconfident than women, as
demonstrated with more aggressive behavior in the stock market, regardless of knowledge. My
method reveals the confidence range, without the other confounding factors of utility in a
decision such as investing. One reason for the results in Kuklinski (2000) is that respondents
perceive an incentive to be strategic about stated confidence levels in political questions, but this
is not an issue when people are revealing, rather than stating their confidence.
45
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will allow researchers to learn more about the absorption and transformation of
information. Better forecasts help researchers connect shocks with changes in the
underlying values of the world and investors make more efficient use of their time and
money. As telephone‐based polling is supplanted by web‐based polling, I hope that this
article will inspire further exploration into graphical, interactive web‐based interfaces
that can ask questions and consequently gather information not possible in standard
telephone‐based or even in‐person‐based polling.

II. Method
I build on the most recent methods of surveying expectations to create a
graphical, interactive web‐based interface that gathers expectations: point‐estimates and
probability distributions. One influence on my method is Delavande and Rohwedder
(2008), which asks respondents for a point‐estimate (on how much social security they
will receive) and then use a visual screen that asks the respondents to distribute 20 balls
(each representing a 5% probability of the outcome) in a series of bins that signify
possible value‐ranges of the outcome. I enhance their method with lessons from the
literature involving the generation of confidence ranges around point‐estimates. A few
key innovations of my method: it distributes probabilities as small as 1% into upwards
of nine bins of value‐ranges, forces the respondent to consider the question from
multiple angles, and uses new graphical tools to efficiently clarify the procedure for the
respondent. Further, after I collect these expectations (i.e., the point‐estimate and
probability distribution) I probe other characteristics of the respondents that may be
correlated with biases or varying information levels.
The first piece of data I recover from the respondent for any specific question is a
“best estimate” point‐estimate. While maintaining overall consistency regardless of the
specifics of the questions, the interface is adjusted enough to ensure that the respondents
provide valid responses. The appropriate interface allows the respondent to understand
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Behavioral Lab (mainly students and staff) and respondents from around the USA with
Mechanical Turk.
Study I concentrates on comparing my method to the methods of stated confidence
and confidence intervals. Each respondent answered one question in the following five
categories: calories, concert ticket prices, gas prices, movie receipts, and unemployment
rate (for question details, see Appendix A). Half of the respondents were randomly
assigned to create the full probably distribution and half were asked state their
confidence and create a confidence interval. The stated confidence is recovered with the
standard polling question: “How confident are you of your answer?” with a drop down
menu of four choices: very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, and not
at all confident. The confidence range is recovered in the most efficient method, asking
the respondent the combination of: “I am 90% sure answer is greater than ________ʺ and
then “I am 90% sure the answer is less than ________ʺ. Soll and Klayman (2004)
demonstrates that respondents reduce overconfidence when they are asked to formulate
an upper and lower limit in separate steps. The theory is also demonstrated in Vul and
Pashler (2008); that article shows that when respondents are forced to think about the
same question in two different ways, they add new information that is not apparent
when they just consider the question from one angle.46
Study II concentrates on comparing my method under different incentives; this
study responds to questions from Becker, Degroot, and Marscak (1964), which

46

Teigen and Jorgensen (2005) concludes that overconfidence is decreased when respondents
assign probabilities to confidence ranges, rather than confidence ranges for a set probability and
similarly Speirs‐Bridge et al. (2010) argues that it is best to ask the respondent to re‐calibrate his
own range (i.e., show them their 80% range they just created and ask them how wide that really
is). The full probability distribution method requests the respondent to input their own
probability to set ranges, rather than input a range to a set probability, but that is not possible
with the confidence ranges. I do not want to make ungrounded assumptions on how to translate
a 60% range into an 80% range. And, without trusting their assumptions and generating uniform
ranges, there is no method of comparing the respondents’ on their calibration, as they would all
have different size ranges.
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determines that any elicitation of expectations should be incentive compatible. Each
respondent answered one question in each of the following five categories: calories, gas
prices, and unemployment rates (as in Study I), and then voter turnout and Senate
election results (for question details, see Appendix A). The voter turnout and Senate
election results are done with the respondents’ home states, so due to lopsided draws,
are not included in this article, but the basis for further research. Movies and concerts
are dropped as categories, because Study II was done in the early fall, where the time
frame was too short for movies and concerts are not frequent enough. While the first
three categories are the same, all of the questions are new. Half of the respondents are
paid with standard flat fee and half of the respondents are paid a flat fee and then
incentivized with an incentive compatible scoring rule. The five respondents with the
lowest weighted square error over all of their responses were given the bonuses.47 Since
Study II is unbalanced in its categories, I only use it in the full data when I am making
comparisons concerning the effect of the incentives.

III. Estimation/Results
Between‐respondent disagreement is much larger than within‐respondent
uncertainty; this demonstrates both the overconfidence of the responses and issues
involving the accuracy of the stated point‐estimates. This comparison is illustrated in
coefficients of variation in Table 2, where between‐respondent disagreement is the
coefficient of variation of the stated point‐estimates for a unique question and within‐
respondent uncertainty is the average coefficient of variation of the individual‐level
probability distributions for that unique question. Gurkaynak and Wolfers (2006)
studied an economic derivative market and show that between‐respondent

I note in parenthesis in the directions “i.e., the most accurate distributions”, because very few
respondents are going to know what a mean square error is, or what type of response minimizes
it. This inability to comprehend the scoring rule is a problem for incentives noted in Artinger
(2010).
47
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disagreement of point‐estimates (submitted by experts) is less dispersed than within‐
forecast uncertainty, illustrated by an efficient market. One reason that the between‐
respondent disagreement is relatively larger, is that in this article I am not studying the
uncertainty in an efficient market, but within each individual, where the standard
deviation of individual‐level probability distributions reflects individual uncertainty of
the outcome. In two paragraphs I will demonstrate that these probability distributions
are too narrow (i.e., overconfident). The second reason is because the respondents are
providing point‐estimates that extend all over their distributions, not just the mean or
median. The standard deviation of the point‐estimates for one question should be
similar to the standard deviation of the most likely outcome perceived by the
respondents of that question. Yet, for some categories of questions the average absolute
log difference between the mean and median of a respondent’s distribution and their
point‐estimate approaches 10%.48 Table 4 provides further insight into the accuracy of
the stated point‐estimates.

Table 1: Coefficients of Variation of Individual‐Level Probability Distributions
and Coefficients of Variation of Point‐Estimates
Study I
Category
Calories
Concert Tickets
Gas Prices
Movie Receipts
Unemployment

Uncertainty
0.221
0.222
0.026
0.314
0.013

Disagreement
0.373
0.384
0.015
0.549
0.039

Study II
Incentivized / non‐Incentivized
Uncertainty
Disagreement
0.175/0.183
0.392
‐
‐
0.027/0.026
0.027
‐
‐
0.018/0.018
0.095

Note: Study I is 120 respondents. Study II is 103 respondents non‐incentivized and 99 respondents
incentivized. Coefficient of variation for uncertainty is (standard deviation)/(mean of
distribution) and for disagreement is (standard deviation)/(mean of point‐estimates).

The data from Study II shows that the alignment of the incentives has a
negligible influence the individual‐level distributions. The incentive compatible pay
While very few point‐estimates that occur on the tails of the probability distributions, for
calories, concert tickets, and movie receipts the mean or median is larger than the point‐estimate
by a statistically significant amount.
48
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rewarded respondents extra for properly calibrated distributions. Table 1 demonstrates
that the coefficients of variation are very similar, regardless of incentives. Regardless of
the outcome, incentives are not ideal for this project, so it is comforting they have a
negligible impact. First, if the researcher outlines the type of response that maximizes
the payout rule, she is manipulating the response, but, in this project, I want the
response to be whatever the respondent thinks is the “best estimate” not what I define as
the “best estimate”. Further, in future articles in this project where I connect the
expectations to decisions, I want the true expectations, not expectations created to fulfill
my scoring rule. Second, non‐payment or flat fees are standard in polling and I want the
results of this project to be relevant.
The calibration of confidence for the individual‐level probability distribution is
very similar to the confidence ranges (where it is comparable); both are slightly
overconfident. Utilizing the data from Study I, the answer lies within the 80%
confidence range 60% of the time and within the middle 80% range of the probability
distribution 58% of the time, a statistically insignificant difference. These are both in line
with most comparable studies, where non‐experts were asked simple knowledge
questions (e.g., the ranking of college or the winning % of NBA teams).49 The probability
distribution forces the respondent to consider the answer for more time, but the
confidence range implores them to consider the question from more angles. This
systematic overconfidence is not a problem for this article, as I care more about the
relationship between confidence and accuracy.50
Confidence derived from the probability distributions correlates positively with
accuracy; this correlation is more sizable than the correlation from the confidence
ranges, and the correlation from the stated confidence is positive, but statistically
Soll and Klayman (2004), Teigen and Jorgensen (2005), and Speirs‐Bridge et al. (2010).
Again, in future work the expectations will be used to inform decision making, so I prefer
authentic representation of the expectations relative to forcing more accurately calibrated
confidence ranges.
49
50
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insignificant. In order to make comparisons across the different types of data and the
different categories, I simplify the data. Within each question I rank the responses from
the least to most confident according to their standard deviation, width of confidence
interval, or stated confidence from 0 to 1 on its position relative to all of the responses to
its unique question. The smallest standard deviation, narrowest confidence range, or
most confident answer is ranked 0, where the highest, widest, and least confident is
ranked 1. I do the same for the error of the point‐estimate. Figure 1 illustrates the
relationship between confidence and accuracy in the probability distribution data.
Relatively low confidence correlates with a lower than average, average rank of error,
and relatively high confidence correlates with a higher than average, average rank of
error. Table 2 shows that the correlations are positive and significant within unique
questions for both the confidence range and probability distribution, but nearly twice as
sizable for the probability distribution. The correlation is positive, but not significant, for
stated confidence.
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Figure 1: Correlations Between Confidence Derived From Probability
Distributions and Accuracy of Point‐Estimate
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Note: Local linear regression estimates, using Epanechnikov kernel and rule‐of‐thumb
bandwidth. Shaded area shows 95% confidence interval.

Table 2: Correlations Between Confidence and Accuracy of Point‐Estimate
Stated
Confidence
0.035
(0.038)
∗
OLS
(Within Question)

)

Confidence
Range

Probability
Distribution

R2

‐

‐

0.000

‐

0.023

‐

0.023

0.231***
(0.040)

0.053

0.006
(0.038)

0.151***
(0.040)
0.150***
(0.041)

‐

‐

‐
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0.103**
(0.050)
∗
Fixed‐Effect
(Within Respondent)

)

‐

0.070
(0.050)

0.233***
(0.051)
0.222***
(0.052)

‐

‐

‐

‐

0.001

‐

0.023

‐

0.022

0.260***
(0.052)

0.053

Note: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). The errors and standard deviations are normalized
by their rank within the unique question. The stated confidence and confidence range questions
were answered by 129 respondents and the probability distribution by 120. There are a total of 48
unique questions in 5 categories; each respondent answered 5 questions, one in each category.

Confidence is not only correlated with accuracy within questions, but within
respondents. Respondents adjust their confidence, relative to the other respondents,
depending on their confidence for a given question. It is relatively easy for a respondent
to shift her confidence between questions when she is using a confidence scale, as the
values remain constant between questions. Yet, for a confidence range or probability
distribution, the relative confidence is uncertain, as average range sizes and standard
deviations vary widely between questions categories. This inability to consciously gauge
relatively confidence makes it difficult for respondents to manipulate their confidence
response for any other incentives than their truthful response.
The wisdom of the crowd is working; the mean or median of the question’s
responses is more accurate than a random respondent for the majority of answers and
has a significantly smaller error. This is shown in Table 3. For example, in Study I, just
24.3% of respondents’ point‐estimates are more accurate than the median point‐estimate
of the respondents. Further, the error for the median is less than that of the mean, on
average and for the vast majority of questions. It is likely that the outliers are bigger
issue in non‐expert point‐estimates than in expert point‐estimates; either way, the
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median is a standard point‐estimate to use for aggregating point‐estimates into
forecast.51

Table 3: Individual‐Level Point‐Estimates
Categories
Questions per Category
Observations per Question
% of Individual‐Level Point‐Estimate Absolute Errors <
Mean Point‐Estimate of Question Absolute Errors
% of Individual‐Level Point‐Estimate Absolute Errors <
Median Point‐Estimate of Question Absolute Errors

Study I
5
9.6
25.8

Study II
3
10
20.1

36.7 %

38.8 %

24.3 %

27.9 %

Note: Point‐estimates are all recorded prior to the probability distributions. Study I is randomized
between probability distribution method and confidence questions, with 249 respondents. Study
II is randomized between flat pay and incentive compatible pay for probability distribution
method, with 202 respondents.

Point‐estimates derived from the probability distributions are more accurate than
the stated point‐estimate. I test three simple point‐estimates from the probability
distributions: mean, median, and mode. On the top of Table 4 I run a Fair‐Shiller (1989
and 1990) regression, which includes the point‐estimate and the probability
distribution’s point‐estimates, with fixed‐effects by category of question. When
compared directly with the stated point‐estimates, the mean and the median of the
probability distribution are both significant at the 10% level where the stated point‐
estimate is not significant, and the coefficients for the mean and median are substantially
larger than the stated point‐estimate’s. I cannot rule out that the mode provides no
information that is not in the stated point‐estimate. By switching to OLS with no
constant and constraining the coefficients to sum to 1, I can determine the optimal
weights of the different variables if I was forced to put them together for a best estimate.
Again, compared directly, the mean and the median are both significant and the stated
point‐estimate is not. There are two plausible explanations for this finding. First, I
Galton (1907) recommends the median for non‐experts guessing the weight of a cow (a point‐
estimate) and this is the inspiration shown repeatedly in Surowiecki’s Wisdom of the Crowd.
Engleberg, et al (2009) also uses the median for GDP and inflation with experts.

51
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cannot rotate the order of the stated point‐estimate and the probability distribution, thus
the respondent may be making a more accurate estimate in the probability distribution
versus the stated point‐estimate, because it is her second chance to consider the
question. Second, the respondents may be ignoring long asymmetric tails of the
probability distribution when they state their point‐estimates, to the detriment of their
accuracy of their stated point‐estimate.

Table 4: Comparing the Point Accuracy of the Individual‐Level Expectations
in regression:

Mean

Median

Mode

0.311*
(0.181)

‐

‐

‐

0.287*
(0.170)

‐

‐

‐

‐0.310
(0.824)
67.8%***
(22.3)

0.824
(0.840)

0.018
(0.142)
‐0.314
(0.221)

‐

‐

‐

61.9%***
(0.211)

‐

‐

‐

‐1.423
(0.962)

2.872***
(1.020)

‐0.228
(0.179)
‐1.211***
(0.267)

Point‐
Estimate
0.187
(0.179)
0.210
(0.168)
0.472***
(0.147)
0.307
(0.198)
32.2%
(22.3)
38.1%*
(0.211)
1.228***
(0.179)
0.763***
(0.241)

Note: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). There are fixed‐effects by category in top
regression. If I run separate OLS regressions with a constant on each category: the mean has a
much larger coefficient (and more significance) in 3 categories, the point‐estimate in 1 category,
and similar in 1 category. If I run a regression for each expectation type by itself, the mean has the
highest R2. There are total of 590 observations in the five categories.

Weighing the point‐estimates by confidence produces more accurate forecasts of
the outcome level than other standard methods. Table 3 illustrates how without a
probability distribution the most accurate consensus forecast of the outcome level is the
median of the point‐estimates for any question. Table 4 shows that on an individual‐
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level, the mean of the probability distribution is the most informative of its point‐
estimates (and more informative than the median of the stated point‐estimates).
Following the literature’s use of the inverse of the mean square error, I use the simplest
and most transparent comparable method of aggregating the means of the probability
distributions to create a consensus forecast; I weigh each mean by the inverse of their
standard deviation squared (i.e., the variance):
1
∑
Any response, i, has the weight of 1

1

divided by the sum of all of the inverse variances

of the responses to its unique question. This method is efficient only if the responses are
efficient, but I have already shown they are overconfident. Yet, this is the most
transparent and universal method available, and it does provide a more accurate
answer.
Illustrated in Table 5, the confidence‐weighted forecasts have more weight
and/or significance more often than the median of the point‐estimates. There is certainly
fluctuation between the categories, but the confidence‐weighted mean demonstrates
itself to be meaningful in relation to the standard method.
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Table 5: Comparing the Point Accuracy of the Most Promising Forecasts
Category

Calories
Concert Tickets
Gas Prices
Movie Receipts
Unemployment

Calories
Concert Tickets
Gas Prices
Movie Receipts
Unemployment

Weight

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

.

.

.

.

.

Median
of Point‐
Estimate

Confidence‐
Weighted
Mean

Median
of Point‐
Estimate

Confidence‐
Weighted
Mean

0.059
(0.286)
0.730
(0.822)
‐0.315
(0.398)
0.805**
(0.319)
‐1.052
(1.786)

1.146***
(0.281)
0.282
(0.677)
‐0.021
(0.425)
‐0.791*
(0.348)
2.097
(1.808)

0.052
(0.245)
0.390
(0.564)
‐0.405
(1.133)
0.458
(0.453)
‐0.480
(1.553)

0.948***
(0.245)
0.610
(0.564)
1.405
(1.133)
0.542
(0.453)
1.480
(1.553)

0.007
(0.286)
0.726
(1.064)
0.342
(0.846)
‐0.499
(0.829)
‐1.017
(1.653)

1.186***
(0.279)
0.303
(0.940)
‐0.633
(0.823)
0.792
(0.773)
2.055
(1.666)

‐0.020
(0.246)
0.272
(0.861)
0.345
(2.463)
1.947**
(0.729)
‐0.738
(1.515)

1.020***
(0.246)
0.728
(0.861)
0.655
(2.463)
‐0.947
(0.729)
1.738
(1.515)

Note: ***, **, and * denote statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. (Standard errors in parentheses). There are 48 question total: 10 for calories, 10 for
gas prices, and 10 for unemployment, 9 for concert tickets, and 9 for movie receipts.

In the second part of Table 5 I explore more efficient weighting for the
confidence‐weighted forecasts. Rather than raising the standard deviation to the
exponent two (i.e., squared), I allow the exponent to fluctuate to whatever generates the
smallest root mean square error for the predicted forecasts from the confidence‐
weighted forecast. There would be a different set of exponents if I take the exponents
that minimize the mean square error of the raw confidence‐weighted forecasts or what
minimizes the jointly predicted mean square error of the confidence‐weighted forecast
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and the median of the point‐estimates. Yet, regardless of which set of efficient exponents
I use to create the confidence‐weighted forecasts, the weighting between the median
point‐estimate and the confidence‐weighted forecast are similar.
Table 6 looks at the R2 from the regression of the answer on just the median of
the point‐estimate, on just the confidence‐weighted forecast, and on both the median of
the point‐estimate and the confidence‐weighted forecast. For two of the categories, the
growth in R2 from median of point‐estimate to having both forecasts is minimal, but in
the other three there are substantial gains (i.e., there is explanatory power in the
confidence‐weighted forecast).
Table 6: Comparing the Point Accuracy of the Most Promising Forecasts, with R2 from
∗
Category
Calories
Concert Tickets
Gas Prices
Movie Receipts
Unemployment

R2 with only
Median of Point‐
Estimate
0.585
0.880
0.308
0.131
0.985

R2 with only
Confidence‐
Weighted Forecast
0.884
0.873
0.347
0.129
0.987

R2 for Joint Forecast
0.884
0.882
0.362
0.534
0.988

Note: The confidence‐weighted forecast is optimized by category as in the lower half of Table 5.
The table is nearly identical regardless of which efficient weighting scheme I utilize.

Two categories of questions have follow‐up questions that can be used to better
calibrate individual‐level responses. First, for the calorie question, I ask “How closely do
you follow calories?” with options that run from “not very closely” to “regularly, and I
know the item in the question.” There is no correlation between self‐reported
information and the rank of absolute error within the question.52 This conforms to results
of Table 5, where similar to stated information, stated confidence levels on a four point
scale fails to gain significance in its correlation with accuracy. Second, for the movie

Study I is slightly negative and insignificant and the non‐treated Study II is slightly positive
and insignificant. Together the coefficient from OLS of intent on rank of error is 0.001 (0.022).
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question, I ask “Are you interested in seeing ‘MOVIE’?” with options that run from
“Definitely not going to watch it” to “Have already been excited about it/Definitely
watch it in a theater.” Thus, this question is combining two dimensions: information and
partiality. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between
information/intent and the point‐estimate; if a respondent likes a movie, she projects it
to earn more money. A fixed‐effect regression of information/intent (which runs from 1
to 5) on the point‐estimate yields a coefficient of 19.47 (5.33) for information/intent (i.e.,
respondents estimate the movie to earn $19.5 million more for each degree of intent to
see the movie). With repeated data, I would be able to inflate or deflate responses to
debias them for the information and partiality of the respondents.

IV. Discussion
There are several reasons why a graphical, interactive interface can collect
information that is difficult to attain in standard telephone or in‐person settings. First,
information can be revealed, rather than stated, which makes it much harder for the
respondents to manipulate the answer to fulfill incentives other than their best estimate.
Second, the interface makes the confidence revelation part of the main question, whereas
asking a respondent to state confidence after they supply the main point‐estimate, may
not seem as serious to the respondent or operate under different incentives. Third,
Ariely, et al (2003) shows that people can incorporate new information into their
understanding of the world; the problem is that they sometimes appear arbitrary,
because they are not sure where with what baseline they should start. A graphical
interface can provide some subtle baselines for the respondent without providing too
much anchoring. For example, in this article, the question regarding calories of fast food
includes pictures and descriptions of a few different foods. Similarly, the presentation of
the questions themselves are providing subtle information about point‐estimates and
probability distributions that teach people how to provide information they have, but do
not know how to elucidate.
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Polls and predication markets are just two methods for gathering individual‐
level information and aggregating it into forecasts; both methods have benefits and
negatives, and my method is one attempt to harness the better aspects of both of them.
One of the key problems with polls is the reluctance of researchers to ask the question
they are trying to answer, which is usually the question that gathers the most relevant
information from the respondent. The graphical and interactive nature of this method
allows me to ask questions that do not gather consistent and meaningful responses in a
telephone or in‐person format. Polls’ transparent aggregation does not take advantage of
disparities in information of the respondent and prediction markets’ more opaque
aggregation does not record massive amounts of information and is susceptible to
manipulation.53 With my method I can capture all of the information and aggregate it,
transparently, with confidence. Further, I can create not only accurate forecasts of the
level of the outcome, but also, I can explore full probability distributions on both the
individual and aggregate level.
The full method proves itself meaningful in absolute terms and trumps simpler
confidence ranges in information, but it does take up more time, which can be important
in polling. The mean (median) length of time from start to finish for the five questions
with the full method is 13.1 (12.0) minutes, while the confidence range variation is 7.6
(6.7) minutes. Further, the confidence range responses provide a statistically significant
positive correlation between confidence and accuracy that can be utilized for the
creation of certainty‐weighted forecasts. The goal of this article is to provide validation
of my method versus the best and most practical of the other possible options on
information and utility, but if time/cost is an issue, there will definitely be scenarios
where the confidence range is the right option.

There is evidence that the national popular vote prediction markets may suffer from
manipulation by people motivated to gain publicity for their chosen candidate. The aggregation
is over willingness to invest money, not confidence!
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Turning to decision making, there is consensus in the literature on the
importance of expectations in decision making. Manski (2004) demonstrates that playing
a simple economic game, a subject with one of three different expectations and one of
two different utility functions will make the same move (i.e., revealed behavior) in four
out of six possible scenarios. He outlines many empirical examples of subjects having
faulty expectations, but emphasizes the gap in the literature in understanding
expectations separated from utility.
The follow‐up question for the gas question hints at the usefulness of my method
in decoupling expectation from utility in revealed decisions. The main question asks the
respondent to imagine that she is driving down a major highway and she notes the price
of gas at last few consecutive stations. She is running low and can hold out only long
enough to stop at one of the next three stations; she is asked to create a probability
distribution of the lowest price of gas among these next three stations. The follow‐up
question asks what price would induce the driver to stop at the first station she sees,
rather than keep going and try one of the following two stations. The median response
was at the 30% point of the probability distribution of what they expect the lowest price
of the next three gas stations to be. That means that the median driver would stop where
they believe that there is only a 30% chance that one of the next two stations would be
less. Just 6% of respondents said they would stop at station in the 80% percentile or
higher. Most importantly, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between
the point‐estimate expectation and price in which the driver would stop for gas. Thus,
the higher the driver expects the lowest price to be, the higher price the driver will stop
and pay. Further, confidence demonstrates a meaningful role in the decision making; if
two drivers have the same point‐estimate, the driver with the larger standard deviation
(i.e., less confidence) will stop at a gas station with a higher price. Expectation matters,
but so does confidence!
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V.
V Append
dix: Samplee Questionss can be fouund on my w
website:
www.Predic
w
ctWise.com
Study I & II (Calories Co
ount): Here is a full exam
mple. It startts with the p
point‐estimaate
uestion:
qu

Calories
C
Cou
unt Probabillity Question
n: Since I plaaced 550 callories at my estimate thee
probability qu
uestion is ceentered on 55
50 calories:
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Calories
C
Cou
unt Follow‐u
up Question
n: All drop d
down menuss start at seleect, forcing th
he
reespondent to
o fill a choicee.

Below are thee other four questions ussed in this sttudy:
Study I Only
y (Concert Ticket Prices): What is yo
our best estimate for thee lowest posssible
price of 2 tick
kets to the no
oted concertt the day beffore the show
w? The top ttable highlig
ghts
on
ne randomly
y selected up
pcoming con
ncert from th
he full list off StubHubʹs top selling
co
oncert tours. The bottom
m table show
ws the lowestt possible prrice (includin
ng all chargees)
fo
or 2 tickets, from
f
either the
t box officce or StubHu
ub, whicheveer is lower, tthat could bee
purchased 10
0 days and 1 day from th
he concert fo
or a random selection of concerts by
n the same list.
l
performers on
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Study I & II (Gas Prices): What is your best estimate for the LOWEST price of gas
among the next 3 stations on the highway described in the below table? The below table
shows the price of gas at the 3 previous gas stations and the question assumes that you
continue down the same highway. All prices are from 8/4/2010 on a major Eastern
highway. (9/16/2010 for the Study II.)
Gas Prices Follow‐up Question: If you had about enough gas where you felt comfortable
driving for up to 3 more stations, what price of gas would induce you to stop at the next
station?
Study I Only (Movie Receipts): What is your best estimate for the 4 week gross for
MOVIE in millions of dollars (i.e. what will MOVIE gross domestically through its 4th
weekend of wide release)? DESCRIPTION OF MOVIE. Nationwide release on DATE OF
RELEASE. The below table shows the domestic gross for the last 30 wide‐release movies
through their 4th weekend of release.
Movie Receipts Follow‐up Question: Are you interested in seeing MOVIE?
Study I & II (Unemployment Rate): What is your best estimate for the
August/September Unemployment Rate in the state noted below (use the slider below to
show your answer)? The below table shows the Unemployment Rate in a randomly
chosen state in a few relevant periods. Unemployment rates are adjusted for seasonal
trends.
Unemployment Rate Follow‐up Question: How familiar are you with the state in the
question?
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